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Abstract
I exploit unusual policy variation in Indonesia to examine how local responses to
intergovernmental grants depend on their persistence. A national reform produced
permanent increases in the general grant that were larger for less densely populated
districts. Hydrocarbon-rich districts experienced transitory shocks to shared resource
revenue. Public service delivery strongly responded to the permanent shock, but not
to the transitory shocks, consistent with districts providing lumpy public services as a
function of lifetime fiscal resources. I provide supporting evidence for this mechanism
and rule out other potential mechanisms. I discuss implications for decentralization
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1 Introduction
Citizens perceive the granting of intergovernmental fiscal transfers as the magical
art of passing money from one government to another and seeing it vanish into
thin air. These perceptions are well grounded in reality in developing countries . . .
(Shah, 2006, p. 17)
Intergovernmental transfers play an outsized role in local public finance in developing
countries, yet many policymakers and academics are skeptical that increasing transfers
to local governments will improve public service delivery. Supporting this skepticism are well-
documented cases of local officials misappropriating funds from the center (e.g., Reinikka
and Svensson, 2004; Olken, 2007; Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011) and several studies showing
that transfers reduce the quality of governance and fail to stimulate greater public good
provision in Latin America.1 The debate is far from over, however. Measurement issues
make it difficult to prove that funds have not been put to good use,2 and some studies have
found positive impacts on public service delivery (Litschig and Morrison, 2013; Olsson and
Valsecchi, 2015).
This paper identifies and addresses a novel empirical challenge: when local governments
are forward-looking, the responses of public services to transitory changes in fiscal transfers
do not reflect the true contribution of these funds to public service delivery. Governments
that optimize intertemporally recognize that transitory changes in volatile transfers, such
as shared natural resource revenue, have a relatively small impact on the intertemporal
budget constraint. Increases in this type of transfer thus may not stimulate investment in
new structures or hiring of frontline workers. Researchers may then mistakenly conclude
that the funds are wasted or stolen, even when local officials are scrupulous. On the other
hand, responses to permanent changes in transfers are highly informative for the marginal
contribution of these funds to public service delivery.
I exploit unusual policy variation in Indonesia to study local government responses to two
intergovernmental transfers of varying persistence. District governments are responsible for
providing public goods and services in the areas of education, health, and local infrastructure,
which are primarily financed by fiscal transfers. The country’s largest intergovernmental
transfer, the general grant, is highly persistent. A change in the allocation formula resulted
in permanent increases in this grant that were larger for less densely populated districts. I
exploit the sharp increase in the revenue gradient in land area per capita to estimate the
causal effects of a permanent increase in fiscal transfers. The second-largest transfer is the oil
1See Caselli and Michaels (2013), Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2013), Monteiro and Ferraz (2014),
and Gadenne (2017) on Brazil, and see Martínez (2020) on Colombia.
2Local governments can spend funds on a variety of projects and can invest in quality improvements that are
not captured in available datasets. Some researchers have confronted these challenges by using detailed data
on a wide array of public goods and services, and by examining outcomes, such as education or income, that
should respond to quality improvements (e.g., Caselli and Michaels, 2013; Litschig and Morrison, 2013).
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and gas grant, which is tied to local hydrocarbon extraction and exhibits significant transitory
variation in hydrocarbon-rich areas. I exploit the central government’s royalty-sharing rule,
spatial variation in initial hydrocarbon endowments, and time-series variation in aggregate
revenue from this grant to estimate the causal effects of transitory shocks to fiscal transfers.
The permanent increase in the general grant stimulated greater provision of public
schools, health facilities and personnel, and local roads. Increasing the grant by IDR 1
million (approximately USD 100) per capita improved overall public service delivery by half
a standard deviation, relative to pre-reform levels. By contrast, transitory shocks to the oil
and gas grant had small and statistically insignificant effects, and the estimates are precise
enough to rule out moderate increases in public service delivery. For most outcomes we
can statistically reject equal responses to the two grants, even after adjusting for multiple
hypothesis testing.
The results are consistent with a model in which local governments provide lumpy public
goods and services as a function of lifetime fiscal resources. The mean-reverting nature of the
oil and gas grant implies that current-year changes have a small impact on lifetime resources.
Even if the government has a high discount rate, it will be hesitant to increase spending on
structures such as schools, which require a large upfront investment and a future stream of
maintenance expenditure, or on employees that enjoy significant job security, when oil and
gas revenue increases. Holding fixed the size of the initial revenue shock, more persistent
increases in revenue are more likely to stimulate large investments and hiring sprees.
Supporting this mechanism, the expenditure response to the general grant is hump-
shaped over time and overshoots at its peak, increasing by about 1.60 rupiah for every rupiah
of revenue, indicating large upfront investments. Hydrocarbon-rich districts do not perfectly
smooth their spending, but the expenditure response to the oil and gas grant is around one
third of the response to the general grant. Furthermore, the gap in the responses is smaller
for more discretionary and less lumpy categories of spending, and larger for capital and
personnel expenditure.
I consider other potential mechanisms for the results. One possibility is that the magnitude
of the grant shocks differ, and responses are nonlinear in the size of the current-year shock.
Another possibility is that districts respond asymmetrically to increases and decreases in
transfers. I test for these two mechanisms and find little evidence that they drive the results. I
also find little evidence that the differential effects of the grants operate through changes in
political competition. Alternatively, the oil and gas grant may be more susceptible to waste or
embezzlement, even though the grants are formally subject to the same rules and oversight
by the central government. If this were true, then permanent increases in the oil and gas
grant should stimulate public service delivery much less than permanent increases in the
general grant. I test this theory by exploiting the increase in permanent oil and gas grant
revenue induced by Indonesia’s decentralization in 2001. Using this source of variation, I find
economically and statistically significant increases in public service delivery that are in the
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same ballpark as the increases induced by the general grant. Although waste and corruption
are common in district governance, they cannot explain a significant portion of the difference
in the responses to the two grants over the post-decentralization period.
Besides unique policy variation, the Indonesian setting offers additional advantages. First,
there are a large number of district governments—over 300—with broad spending authority
in the areas of education, health, and infrastructure. Second, national regulations deprive
district governments of any control over income-tax or property-tax policy. This eliminates
an important margin of response to revenue shocks—tax cuts—and enables the analysis to
isolate the decision of how much to spend rather than save, and when to spend. Third, rich
data on district fiscal outcomes and public service delivery over 1999–2014 make it possible
to examine dynamic responses to fiscal transfers along many margins.
The results are informative for decentralization policy around the world. International
organizations have pushed for greater fiscal decentralization in the developing world (World
Bank, 1999; United Nations, 2009), but central governments have generally been hesitant to
devolve tax responsibilities to local governments. Consequently, intergovernmental grants
finance around 60 percent of subnational expenditure in developing countries but only
around a third of subnational expenditure in OECD countries (Shah, 2006). An important
question is whether central governments in developing countries should cede more tax
authority to subnational governments to strengthen tax-benefit linkages (Gadenne and
Singhal, 2014). Knowing how effective fiscal transfers are at achieving their objectives, and
what type of variation in transfers can yield this information, is crucial in this debate.
This paper contributes to multiple literatures in development and public finance. First,
it contributes to the literature that examines whether intergovernmental transfers actually
improve public service delivery. As already mentioned, the evidence in this literature is
mixed.3 Motivated by the disappointing performance of some fiscal transfer programs,
Gadenne (2017) and Martínez (2020) examine whether increases in local tax revenue lead
to better outcomes than increases in transfers in Brazil and Colombia, respectively. Both
studies conclude that tax revenue stimulates improvements in public service delivery, but
transfers do not.4 In this literature little attention is paid to the persistence of the revenue
shocks used for causal identification, which cannot be summarized by simple measures like
the within-unit coefficient of variation. Consequently, it is difficult to know whether the
divergent results are due to differences in context, accountability, or revenue persistence.
Second, this paper is related to research on the so-called flypaper effect, the empirical
regularity that local governments have a greater propensity to spend out of non-matching
3Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Monteiro and Ferraz (2014) find that shared oil and gas revenue caused
declines in public service delivery in Brazilian municipalities. However, Litschig and Morrison (2013) show that
in an earlier period in Brazil, a formula-based, general-purpose transfer improved education outcomes. Olsson
and Valsecchi (2015) provide earlier evidence that Indonesia’s oil and gas grant improved public service delivery
using a shorter panel and a different empirical strategy.
4In a related study, Borge, Parmer, and Torvik (2015) find that tax revenue and natural resource revenue have
similar effects on spending efficiency in Norwegian municipalities.
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grants than out of local private income.5 This research seeks to determine how much grant
revenue is spent, and how much is passed on to citizens via lower taxes. By contrast, I focus
on the dynamic responses of expenditure and public service delivery in a setting where
local governments have no control over tax rates.6 I build on this literature by showing
that permanent increases in fiscal transfers induce larger and more immediate expenditure
responses than transitory increases.7 Knowing the timing of fiscal responses to grants is
important for conducting countercyclical fiscal policy in a federation.
Finally, this research contributes to the literature on the resource curse (van der Ploeg,
2011). One concern in this literature is that the volatility and sheer size of resource-related
fiscal transfers will lead to wasteful and volatile local spending (Cust and Viale, 2016; Natural
Resource Governance Institute, 2016). If this concern is well founded, then central governments
should consider smoothing revenue on behalf of local governments and distributing the
funds from resource extraction more evenly across regions. I contribute to this debate by
showing that in the context of Indonesia, natural resource revenue and less volatile general-
purpose grants promote public service delivery to a similar degree, after properly accounting
for the persistence of revenue shocks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information
on institutions and local public finance in Indonesia following the transition to democracy.
Section 3 presents a theoretical model of public expenditure on nondurable and lumpy
durable goods in order to highlight how responses can depend on grant persistence and to
generate testable predictions. Section 4 discusses the fiscal responses of districts to the two
grants, and Section 5 discusses the impacts on public service delivery. Section 6 provides
concluding remarks.
2 Decentralization in Indonesia
2.1 Institutional Background
The resignation of Suharto as president of Indonesia in 1998 marked the end of three
decades of centralized, authoritarian rule and gave way to democratic reforms and fiscal
decentralization. There are four levels of subnational public administration in Indonesia:
province, district, subdistrict, and village. Districts are responsible for the bulk of subnational
policymaking; provinces mostly play a coordinating role, and subdistricts (kecamatan) carry
5See Hines and Thaler (1995) and Inman (2008) for summaries of the literature. Recent contributions include
Knight (2002), Baicker (2005), Dahlberg, Mörk, Rattsø, and Ågren (2008), Lutz (2010), Gennari and Messina
(2014), Vegh and Vuletin (2015), Lundqvist (2015), Dahlby and Ferede (2016), and Liu and Ma (2016).
6Gordon (2004), Cascio, Gordon, and Reber (2013), Leduc and Wilson (2017), and Helm and Stuhler (2020)
also estimate dynamic fiscal responses to grants.
7To the best of my knowledge, the only other paper that compares fiscal responses to two grants with differing
persistence is Besfamille, Jorrat, Manzano, and Sanguinetti (2019), who find qualitatively similar results using
data on Argentinian provinces.
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out district policies. Districts are categorized as either rural districts (kabupaten) or urban
districts (kota), but both types operate under the same political and fiscal institutions. Starting
in 1999, district parliaments were directly elected through a proportional representation
system. The district heads (“mayors”) previously appointed by Suharto were allowed to finish
their five-year terms, after which time the local parliament appointed the mayor. Starting
in 2005, districts selected the mayor by direct election. Incumbent mayors were allowed to
finish their terms before direct elections could be held, resulting in a staggered rollout of
direct elections across districts from 2005 to 2008. Mayors can serve at most two five-year
terms.
The “Big Bang” decentralization reforms of 2001 devolved significant expenditure authority
to districts, so that Indonesia now ranks as one of the most decentralized countries in
the developing world (Shah, Qibthiyyah, and Dita, 2012). Panel A of Table 1 summarizes
district revenue and expenditure. Districts provide public goods and services in the areas
of education, health, and local infrastructure. However, own-source revenue accounts for
only seven percent of total district revenue, so public expenditure is primarily financed by
intergovernmental grants.8 Most local funding comes from an unconditional grant known
as the general grant (Dana Alokasi Umum), which accounts for over half of district revenue
on average. A minority of districts receive significant revenue from local natural resource
extraction. I discuss these two revenue sources in detail ahead. A small portion of expenditure
is financed by earmarked “special grants” (Dana Alokasi Khusus) provided by the central
government on a discretionary basis. Districts were prohibited from introducing income or
property taxes over the study period, however they received a portion of tax revenue collected
by the central government within the district. Shared tax revenue accounts for around seven
percent of the district budget.
Following decentralization, subnational borrowing has been minimal, for three reasons.
First, the central government banned foreign borrowing by districts and must pre-approve
domestic borrowing (Blöndal, Hawkesworth, and Choi, 2009). Second, many districts have
poor credit ratings. Finally, district governments have had difficulty spending all of their
transfer revenue in a timely fashion, leading to a buildup of reserves (World Bank, 2007,
pp. 127–128). Current revenue and reserves typically suffice to finance large capital projects
and smooth current expenditure.
The number of districts has grown from 341 in 2001 to 514 in 2014, due to district splitting.9
The central government imposed two moratoria on splitting during the analysis period, the
first from 2004 to 2006 and the second from 2009 to 2012. As a consequence, no splits occurred
in 2006, the year that the general grant and the oil and gas grant experienced their largest
shocks, as discussed ahead. Due to the structure of the general grant, transfers typically
8Own-source revenue mostly consists of business license fees, hotel and restaurant taxes, and utility fees.
9See Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser (2005), Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov, and Sieber (2012), and Bazzi and
Gudgeon (2020) for details.
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increase in per-capita terms in both the original district and the new district(s) after a split.
The baseline regressions flexibly control for district splits, though none of the results are
sensitive to controlling for splits.
Indonesia initiated a second wave of decentralization reforms with the 2015 Village Law,
which increased the authority of village governments to provide public services and increased
fiscal transfers to villages. I focus on the period 2001–2014 to hold the federal structure
constant.
2.2 General Grant
As already mentioned, the largest source of financing for most district governments is the
General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum), or “general grant” for short. The general
grant is intended to equalize district capacity to provide local public services.10 Each year
the central government sets the total budget for the grant and allocates funds according to a
formula. Half of the grant pool funds the “basic allocation,” which covers the civil service
wage bill. The basic allocation increases one-for-one with wage costs, but central regulations
on recruitment and staffing prevent exorbitant spending on public employees that would
otherwise occur due to the structure of the grant (Shah et al., 2012). The remaining half of the
general grant pool is allocated according to the “fiscal gap,” which is the difference between
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. Expenditure needs are calculated as a weighted sum
of indices related to population, land area, poverty, and construction costs. Fiscal capacity is
defined as a weighted sum of imputed own-source revenue, shared tax revenue, and shared
natural resource revenue. Appendix Section A.2 provides details on the formulae. After paying
civil servant wages, districts have complete discretion over how to spend the grant.
In 2006 the central government dramatically increased the budget for the general grant.
The grant budget depends on forecasts of the national government’s long-term budget health,
and a key parameter in these forecasts is the assumed future oil price. For years, the central
government had deliberately underestimated the oil price to reduce its transfer obligations
(Lewis and Oosterman, 2009). Since 1999, the debt-to-GDP had been falling rapidly, creating
space for expanding transfers (World Bank, 2007, p. 10). In 2006 the general grant budget
increased by 44 percent after the central government increased the oil price assumption
from USD 30 per barrel to USD 60 per barrel (Agustina, Ahmad, Nugroho, and Siagian, 2012).
That same year the central government changed the allocation formula, reducing the weight
assigned to population and increasing the weight assigned to land area. The change in
general grant revenue per capita dictated by the formula adjustment and budget increase
was roughly linear in land area per capita. (See Appendix Section A.2.) Districts rich in oil
and gas resources should have experienced a decline in general grant funds at this time, due
10Equalization grants have the potential to promote equity by targeting areas populated by households with
low earning potential. In real-world contexts, such as in Canada, such grants often distort household location
decisions and fall short of equity goals (Albouy, 2012).
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to a rise in oil and gas revenue. However, a hold-harmless provision froze the general grant
allocation in place for these resource-abundant districts (World Bank, 2007, p. 121). Both the
increase in the budget and the change in the allocation formula were announced in October
of 2004 (Law No. 33/2004).
Changes to the grant budget and formula in years other than 2006 were relatively minor,
so the reform-driven variation in general grant revenue per capita can be approximated as
Gd ,t ≈ θd +πAd ·Nd ·1(t ≥ 2006),
where π > 0, Ad is land area per capita in district d in 2006, Nd is an indicator for being
located in a non-hydrocarbon-rich province, and 1(t ≥ 2006) is an indicator for years 2006
and later.11 The above expression shows that in provinces without significant hydrocarbon
endowments, general grant revenue per capita permanently increased in 2006, and the
magnitude of the increase was proportional to district land area per capita. Data on district
land area and population come from the World Bank’s Indonesia Database for Policy and
Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER), and data on intergovernmental grants come from the
Ministry of Finance (Kementerian Keuangan). (See Appendix Section A.4 for details.)
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that while less densely populated districts initially received
more general grant revenue per capita than more densely populated districts, the gap
permanently widened starting in 2006 in non-hydrocarbon-rich provinces. By contrast,
in hydrocarbon-rich provinces the gap was roughly constant over time, and there was
no permanent increase in the general grant. The policy reform of 2006 therefore created
significant cross-district variation in the size of a permanent shock to the general grant within
provinces that lack significant oil and gas resources.
The 2006 reform was intended to increase fiscal equalization across regions. There is little
indication that political considerations determined the nature of the reform. Conceivably,
members of the national legislature representing less densely populated districts could have
used the reform to help their own reelection prospects or the prospects of incumbents in
the district legislatures. The timing of the reform is inconsistent with this story, however, as
elections for both the national and district legislatures took place in 1999, 2004, 2009, and
2014. Alternatively, members of the national legislature may have wanted to improve the
reelection prospects of incumbent mayors in less densely populated districts. If this were the
case, then one would expect to see a disproportionate number of mayoral elections taking
place in these districts in 2006. In reality, among resource-poor provinces, the average land
area per capita of districts with mayoral elections in 2006 is statistically indistinguishable
from the average land area per capita of districts with mayoral elections in 2005, 2007, or
2008.12 This is unsurprising, as the timing of direct mayoral elections was largely determined
11The hydrocarbon-rich provinces are Riau, Kepulauan Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Selatan, and Kalimantan Timur.
(See Appendix Figure A.1.)
12Results available upon request.
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by idiosyncratic historical factors (Martínez-Bravo, Mukherjee, and Stegmann, 2017). Overall,
there is little reason to believe that the timing or size of the general grant reform were
motivated by political considerations.
2.3 Oil and Gas Grant
Districts containing natural resources receive Shared Natural Resource Revenue (Dana Bagi
Hasil Sumber Daya Alam), which depends on the revenue (royalties and taxes) collected by
the central government from resource extraction within the district and province. Oil and
natural gas are by far the largest sources of natural resource revenue in Indonesia. According
to the sharing rule, 15.5 percent of oil revenue collected within a district is redistributed to
subnational governments: 3.1 percent goes to the provincial government, 6.2 percent goes
to the producing district, and the remaining 6.2 percent is evenly divided among the other
districts located in the same province. The sharing rule for natural gas is more generous
to subnational governments: 6.1 percent goes to the provincial government, 12.2 percent
goes to the producing district, and another 12.2 percent is divided equally among the other
districts in the province. Despite the less generous sharing rule, shared oil revenue on average
exceeds shared gas revenue due to the higher value of oil production. Districts have complete
discretion over how to spend the oil and gas grant.13
Using the proprietary Rystad UCube database (Rystad Energy, 2016), I calculate the total
economically recoverable oil and gas resources in each district as of 2000 (and known in
2000)—prior to fiscal decentralization. I then convert physical endowments into monetary
values using the average prices of oil and gas over 2001–2014, insert these variables into
the revenue-sharing formula in place of actual oil and gas revenue, and divide by district
population. The resulting variable, denoted by Ed ,t , represents the predetermined oil and gas
endowment to which district d has a claim for revenue-sharing purposes, in constant 2010
IDR (billions) per capita. Appendix Section A.3 provides more details on the sharing rule and
the endowment variable.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that in districts in the top 5 percent in terms of hydrocarbon
endowment, the oil and gas grant was large and experienced sharp year-to-year changes,
especially over the period 2005–2009. The oil and gas grant was significantly smaller for
districts between the 90th and 95th percentiles of endowment, and virtually nonexistent for
districts in the bottom 90 percent. The figure also graphs total oil and gas grant revenue
against the weighted value of oil and gas production, where the value of oil production
is given a weight of 0.062 and the value of gas production is given a weight of 0.122. The
13In 2009 the central government slightly increased the amount of oil and gas revenue shared with subnational
governments, earmarking this additional revenue for education. As a result, after 2009 around three percent of
the district’s oil grant, and two percent of the district’s gas grant, was earmarked. This earmarking is unlikely to
play any role in district spending decisions, as earmarked funds are extremely small relative to total education
spending, which represents one third of the district budget on average.
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weighted value of production should be roughly proportional to the central government’s
transfer obligations dictated by the sharing rule. However, the two time series do not track
each other—not even with a lag—indicating that the central government varied the timing of
grant disbursements on a discretionary basis. The variation in the oil and gas grant driven
by resource endowments and central government policies is captured by Ed ,t · R̃(−d),t , where
R̃(−d),t is aggregate oil and gas grants excluding own-district grant revenue.
14
2.4 Geographic Variation in Exposure to Grant Shocks
The maps in Figure 2 show the spatial variation in district exposure to shocks to the two grants.
Every island group except for Java contains districts with high exposure to the general grant
reform—that is, low population density. Furthermore, there is rich within-island variation in
land area per capita in all island groups except for Java. Oil and gas endowments are fairly
geographically concentrated, with five provinces containing the bulk of the deposits and
around one third of districts having an endowment of zero. Nevertheless, there is significant
cross-district variation in endowments within most island groups and within hydrocarbon-
rich provinces.
2.5 Magnitude and Persistence of Grant Shocks
Both the general grant and oil and gas grant are unconditional, non-matching, and subject to
the same level of central-government oversight. Hence, they differ only in their time-series
variation. I divide this variation into two components: (1) the initial magnitude of shocks,
and (2) the persistence of shocks. To examine the initial magnitude of shocks, Appendix
Figure A.2 plots the distribution of the absolute two-year change in the general grant during
2005–2007 and the distribution of all absolute two-year changes in the oil and gas grant. In
the subsample of districts with high exposure to one of the two grants, these distributions are
reasonably similar, and equal in mean. (See Appendix Section A.5 for details.)
Appendix Table A.1 presents estimates of persistence based on a dynamic panel model.
The GMM estimates of the autoregressive coefficients for the general grant nearly sum to one,
implying almost “perfect” persistence. The estimates for the oil and gas grant are less precise,
but the totality of the evidence suggests the oil and gas grant is significantly less persistent
than the general grant. (See Appendix Section A.6 for details.) The within-district coefficient
of variation of the oil and gas grant (1.58) is 5 times that of the general grant (0.32), confirming
that the oil and gas grant is more “volatile” than the general grant. However, this measure
does not capture the persistence of shocks.15
14Excluding own-district oil and gas grant revenue from the calculation of aggregate oil and gas grants avoids a
potential source of bias in the event that district oil and gas grant revenue is endogenous. Including own-district
oil and gas grant revenue in the calculation makes little difference for the estimates, however, as the number of
districts is large and no district accounts for more than 10 percent of total oil and gas revenue.
15To see this, consider an example with two grants and four time periods. For any constant µ, the first grant
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3 Theoretical Model
This section develops a simple model of public expenditure, building on Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1996, pp. 96–98). The goal is to understand how public good provision responds to
revenue shocks of differing persistence, and how lumpy investment affects these responses.
Suppose the local government provides a nondurable good, C , and a durable good, D . The
durable good evolves according to the equation of motion D t = (1−δ)D t−1 + It , where It is
durable-good investment in period t , and δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate. Let pt denote the
(exogenous) price of durable-good investment in units of the nondurable good in period t .
Total government spending in period t is Gt ≡Ct +pt It . The local government has access to a
risk-free bond with exogenous rate of return r . Fiscal transfers from the central government,
Ft , are the local government’s only source of revenue. Net assets, At , evolve according to the
equation of motion At+1 = (1+ r )At +Ft −Ct −pt It . The local government’s intertemporal
budget constraint is
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+ r
)t
(Ct +pt It ) = (1+ r )A0 +
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+ r
)t
Ft .
The government discounts citizen utility over time with factor β ∈ (0,1). The government
may be impatient, in that its discount rate may be greater than the interest rate (β< 1/(1+r )).
Initially assume that investment is frictionless (non-lumpy). The government has perfect
foresight and chooses a sequence {Ct ,D t }∞t=0 to maximize
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
γ logCt + (1−γ) logD t
)
,
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint and the equation of motion for durables.16
Let γ ∈ (0,1) so that the citizen wants to consume both goods.
The optimal path of public good provision is characterized by the equations
Ct+1 =β(1+ r )Ct ,
(1−γ)Ct
γD t
= pt −
1−δ
1+ r
pt+1 ≡ ιt . (1)
The first is the usual Euler equation for consumption of nondurables, and the second states
that the marginal rate of substitution between nondurables consumption and durables
equals µ−1 in the first two periods and µ+1 in the last two periods for all districts. The second grant alternates
between µ−1 and µ+1 in each period for all districts. The within-unit coefficient of variation is the same for
both grants.
16The model abstracts from private consumption in order to focus attention on the government’s optimal
expenditure plan. As there is no taxation in the model, adding private consumption would not change any of the
results below as long as citizen preferences for private consumption and public consumption were separable.
10
consumption equals the user cost of durables. Define the stock of lifetime resources,
R = (1+ r )A0 + (1−δ)p0D−1 +
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+ r
)t
Ft .
Combining the optimality conditions with the intertemporal budget constraint yields the
optimal levels of public good provision in each period,
Ct =β
t (1+ r )tγ(1−β)R, D t =
1
ιt
βt (1+ r )t (1−γ)(1−β)R.
Next consider how public good provision responds to revenue shocks. Suppose transfers
evolve deterministically according to the difference equation
Ft = ρFt−1 +ψt ,
where ρ ∈ [0,1] measures the persistence of the transfer. The effect of shock ψt on transfers
j periods later is ∂Ft+ j /∂ψt = ρ j . In particular, a one-unit increase in ψ0 causes transfers
to increase by one in all periods if ρ = 1 (permanent increase), but it causes only period-0
transfers to increase by one if ρ = 0 (transitory increase). The effect of a period-0 revenue
shock on lifetime resources is ∂R/∂ψ0 = (1+ r )/(1+ r −ρ), so the response of public good
provision in period t is
∂Ct
∂ψ0
=βt (1+ r )tγ(1−β)
1+ r
1+ r −ρ
,
∂D t
∂ψ0
=
1
ιt
βt (1+ r )t (1−γ)(1−β)
1+ r
1+ r −ρ
. (2)
The above expressions immediately imply the following result.
Proposition 3.1 The public goods response to a revenue shock is increasing in the persistence
of the shock:
∂2Ct
∂ρ∂ψ0
> 0,
∂2D t
∂ρ∂ψ0
> 0 for all t .
Proposition 3.1 holds because more persistent shocks have a larger impact on lifetime
resources.
Because D t−1 is predetermined in period t , the initial investment response equals the
initial durables response, while the investment response in subsequent periods reflects the
change in durables net of depreciation,
∂I0
∂ψ0
=
∂D0
∂ψ0
,
∂It
∂ψ0
=
∂D t
∂ψ0
− (1−δ)
∂D t−1
∂ψ0
for t ≥ 1. (3)
Absent a steep downward trend in the user cost of durables over time, investment responds
more in the current period than in subsequent periods, as does total government expenditure—
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even when the government’s discount rate equals the interest rate.17 Together, the expressions
in (2) and (3) imply the following result.
Proposition 3.2 For any discount factor β≤ (1+ r )−1, total expenditure “overshoots,”
∂G0
∂ψ0
>
r
1+ r −ρ
,
initially increasing by more than the increase in permanent income (r R/(1+ r )) due to the
shock.18 In particular, if transfers are perfectly persistent (ρ = 1), then spending initially
increases more than one-for-one with current transfers (∂G0/∂ψ0 > 1). In addition, the
spending response is always smaller in subsequent periods,
∂Gt
∂ψ0
<
∂G0
∂ψ0
for t ≥ 1,
as long as a weak condition holds for the path of investment costs.19
To summarize, when investment is non-lumpy, the expenditure response to a shock to
fiscal transfers (1) is larger the more persistent are transfers and (2) initially overshoots under
mild assumptions, due to upfront investment in durables.
Now suppose that investment is lumpy due to non-convex adjustment costs. The local
government incurs a fixed cost ξ> 0 every time it makes a “large” adjustment to the stock
of durables. Following Khan and Thomas (2008), the government does not pay this fixed
cost if adjustment is sufficiently small relative to the stock of durables—formally, if It ∈
[aD t−1,bD t−1], where a ≤ 0 ≤ b. An example of such an investment is routine maintenance.
To simplify the dynamics of the model, assume that the price of investment is constant,
ιt = ι for all t . Further assume that the government’s discount rate equals the interest rate
(β(1+ r ) = 1). Under these two assumptions the desired provision of the two public goods is
17For t ≥ 1,
∂I0
∂ψ0
−
∂It
∂ψ0
=
(1−γ)(1−β)(1+ r )
1+ r −ρ
(
1
ι0
−βt−1(1+ r )t−1
[
β(1+ r )
ιt
−
1−δ
ιt−1
])
18To see this, note that
∂G0
∂ψ0
=
(1−β)(1+ r )
1+ r −ρ
(
γ+ (1−γ)
p0
ι0
)
,
and p0 > ι0 as long as the price of investment is always strictly positive.
19Because
∂Gt
∂ψ0
=βt (1+ r )t
(1−β)(1+ r )
1+ r −ρ
(
γ+ (1−γ)
[
pt
ιt
−
1−δ
β(1+ r )
pt
ιt−1
])
,
a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the inequality to hold is p0/ι0 > pt /ιt − (1−δ)pt /ιt−1.
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constant over time and equal to
Ct =C = γ
r
1+ r
R, D t = D =
1−γ
ι
r
1+ r
R for all t .
Finally, assume that b = δ so that the government can maintain a constant stock of durables
without incurring the fixed cost. Regardless of whether these three assumptions are imposed,
the investment response to a revenue shock will be concentrated in the initial period. The
simplifying assumptions make it easier to analyze how non-convex adjustment costs affect
this investment response.
For a period-0 shock of size dψ0, let dR = dψ0(1+ r )/(1+ r −ρ) denote the change in
lifetime resources. If the government does not incur the fixed cost, public good provision is
C = γ
r
1+ r
R +
r
1+ r
dR, D =
1−γ
ι
r
1+ r
R.
The shock leaves the stock of durables unchanged, and all additional resources are devoted to
the nondurable good. If the government does incur the fixed cost, the public goods increase
proportionally with the increase in lifetime resources, net of the fixed cost:
C = γ
r
1+ r
(R +dR −ξ), D =
1−γ
ι
r
1+ r
(R +dR −ξ).
Let d̃R denote the change in lifetime resources for which the government is indifferent
between incurring the fixed cost and not incurring the fixed cost. Then d̃R satisfies
γ log
(
γ
r
1+ r
R +
r
1+ r
d̃R
)
+ (1−γ) log
(
1−γ
ι
r
1+ r
R
)
=
γ log
(
1−γ
ι
r
1+ r
(R + d̃R −ξ)
)
+ (1−γ) log
(
1−γ
ι
r
1+ r
(R + d̃R −ξ)
)
, (4)
where clearly d̃R > ξ.
Proposition 3.3 Durable good provision increases only in response to large increases in lifetime
resources:
dD =



1−γ
ι
r
1+r (dR −ξ) if dR > d̃R
0 if dR < d̃R,
where d̃R is defined by Equation (4).
To summarize, when there are no fixed costs of adjusting the durable good, the response
of the durable good to a revenue shock (dψ0) is increasing in the persistence (ρ) of the shock.
When there are fixed costs of adjustment, the durable good may not respond at all if the shock
is sufficiently small or its persistence sufficiently low. Thus both the size of the initial shock
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and its persistence matter for the composition of the spending response. As discussed in the
previous section, among Indonesian districts that are highly exposed to shocks to either the
general grant or the oil and gas grant, the size of the initial shock is similar for both grants.
Therefore, shocks to the two grants have different impacts on behavior primarily because of
differences in persistence.
The model makes several simplifying assumptions for the purpose of tractability. The
appendix discusses how the results might be altered by incorporating supply bottlenecks,
liquidity constraints, or uncertainty into the model. An important omission from the model
is bureaucratic delay. District governments in Indonesia sometimes receive transfers late in
the year, face delays in the process of getting budgets approved by the province, and have
difficulty procuring goods and services in a timely manner. Fiscal responses thus may occur
with a lag. The empirical tests discussed ahead allow for lagged responses.
Another important consideration is corruption. Local officials may appropriate a portion
of the fiscal transfers for private consumption, driving a wedge between reported spending
and actual public good provision. In the presence of corruption, the qualitative predictions
of the model still hold, as long as the share of resources appropriated by government officials
does not vary markedly with the persistence of transfers.20
A final consideration is asymmetric responses. Public good provision may respond
differently to increases and decreases in transfers, possibly because reducing the stock of
durables is more costly than increasing the stock. This could matter empirically, because the
oil and gas grant experienced both increases and decreases, whereas the general grant only
experienced an increase. I test for asymmetric responses ahead.
4 Fiscal Responses to Grants
4.1 Data
I begin the empirical analysis by estimating the dynamic fiscal responses to the general grant
and the oil and gas grant, with the goal of testing the predictions of the theoretical model.
Data on district revenue and expenditure come from the Ministry of Finance and INDO-
DAPOER. All fiscal variables are expressed in constant 2010 IDR 1 million (approximately USD
100) per capita. To ensure that all districts in the sample operate under the same institutional
environment, I omit provinces that have a special administrative or fiscal arrangement with
the central government. The final sample contains 344 districts from 29 provinces. (See
Appendix Section A.4 for details.)
20For example, if the local government’s felicity function is λ(γ logCt + (1−γ) logD t )+ (1−λ) logSt , where St
is rents, then public good provision is a share λ of the provision under no corruption, and similar comparative
statics obtain.
14
4.2 Identifying Assumptions
Both grants could be endogenous in the sense that they are correlated with unobserved
determinants of spending and public service delivery. The general grant is likely endogenous
because it is a function of the civil service wage bill and fiscal need. An adverse shock
that increases district poverty would likely lead to an increase in the general grant while
stimulating greater demand for public services. The oil and gas grant could also be endogenous
if it responds to the local business environment, local economic shocks, conflict, or other
unobservables that affect district expenditure and public services. Furthermore, grant
amounts could, in theory, deviate from the allocations prescribed by law due to political
manipulation. Such deviations could reflect the relative bargaining power of the district,
introducing another source of endogeneity. In light of these potential sources of bias, I exploit
the sources of exogenous variation in grants described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
I capture exogenous variation in the general grant with the instrumental variable Ad ·
Nd ·1(t ≥ 2006), where Ad is land area per capita in district d in 2006, Nd is an indicator
for being located in a non-hydrocarbon-rich province, and 1(t ≥ 2006) is an indicator for
years 2006 and later. As already mentioned, this instrument is relevant because in non-
hydrocarbon-rich provinces the permanent increase in the general grant dictated by the 2006
reform was proportional to land area per capita. Intuitively, the empirical strategy compares
the change in the general grant revenue gradient in land area per capita to the change in the
corresponding spending gradient for districts in non-hydrocarbon-rich provinces. The key
identifying assumption is that the spending gradient would not have changed in the absence
of the 2006 reform. This assumption allows the level of spending to be correlated with land
area per capita, but it rules out any correlation between land area per capita and changes
in spending due to factors other than the 2006 reform. Put another way, the assumption
basically states that outcomes in districts with different population densities would have
followed parallel paths over time in the absence of the general grant reform. While this
identifying assumption is not testable, it would be more plausible if the spending gradient
in land area per capita were constant over time prior to the reform, and if there were no
confounding policy changes that were systematically related to the 2006 reform. I test for a
constant pre-reform gradient and examine confounding policies ahead.
I capture exogenous variation in the oil and gas grant with the instrumental variable
Ed ,t · R̃(−d),t , where Ed ,t is the predetermined oil and gas endowment to which district d has a
claim for revenue-sharing purposes, and R̃(−d),t is aggregate oil and gas grants excluding own-
district revenue. The validity of this instrument hinges on the assumption that outcomes in
districts with different endowment levels would have followed parallel trends in the absence
of shocks to the oil and gas grant. This rules out omitted factors that covary with aggregate oil
and gas grants over time and differentially affect districts with different endowment levels.
One concern is that districts with better political institutions and leadership may attract more
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oil and gas exploration, increasing known endowment (Cust and Harding, 2019; Cassidy, 2019;
Arezki, van der Ploeg, and Toscani, 2019). The instrument avoids contamination along these
lines by measuring endowment known as of 2000, prior to fiscal decentralization. Before
2001, the central government was the sole actor negotiating with oil and gas companies, so
incentives to explore were roughly uniform across the country.21 It is therefore plausible that
predetermined endowment is uncorrelated with the unobserved quality of governance.
A second concern is that district-level oil and gas production may be correlated with the
instrument, leading to estimates that conflate the effects of production and shared revenue.
However, as already discussed, aggregate oil and gas grant revenue does not covary with
aggregate oil and gas production—or its lags—apparently because the central government
varies the timing of grant disbursements on a discretionary basis (Figure 1). Indeed, the
largest shock to oil and gas grants occurred in 2006, the same year the central government
increased the general grant budget in response to an upwardly revised oil price forecast. This
policy change was exogenous from the standpoint of district governments and unrelated to
trends in oil and gas production.
4.3 Reduced-Form Effects over Time
I first present graphical evidence by plotting the reduced-form impacts of exposure to grant
shocks over time. To do so, I estimate the regression
Yd ,t =
∑
j 6=2005
θ j Ad ·Nd ·D
j
t +
∑
j 6=2005
γ j Ed ·D
j
t +π
′Xd ,t +αd +λi (d),t +ud ,t , (5)
where Yd ,t is total expenditure in district d and year t , Ad is land area per capita in 2006, Nd is
an indicator for being located in a non-hydrocarbon-rich province, Ed is average hydrocarbon
endowment per capita over 2001–2014, and D jt is an indicator that equals one if t = j . The
covariates Xd ,t are indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent
and child districts, as well as two lags of these indicators.22 The model also includes district
fixed effects, αd , and island-by-year effects, λi (d),t .
23 The coefficient θ j captures the change
in the gradient of spending in exposure to the general grant reform between 2005 and year j .
Similarly, γ j captures the change in the gradient of spending in exposure to the oil and gas
grant between 2005 and year j . I also estimate Equation (5) with the grants as outcomes to
visualize the time-varying effects of exposure on grant revenue.
Throughout the paper I report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and
two-way clustering at the district and province-by-year levels to account for within-district
21Separatist violence in Aceh and Papua has disrupted resource extraction in the past, but these regions are
excluded from the sample due to their special fiscal arrangements with the central government.
22This precise specification is motivated by the patterns observed in the data: general grant revenue per capita
steadily increases in the two years after a split, and the increase is larger for child districts.
23Following the Indonesian Statistical Bureau, I code seven island groups: Sumatra, Java, Nusa Tenggara,
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua.
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serial correlation and cross-district correlation within provinces in a given year (Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller, 2011). The within-district correlation is due to the persistence of fiscal
variables and unobservables over time. The cross-district correlation could arise from the
fact that, in any given year, non-producing districts located in the same province are entitled
to the same amount of oil and gas grant revenue.
Figure 3 displays point estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for the parameters
in Equation (5). Panel (a) plots the estimates of {θ j } separately for total expenditure (blue
circles) and general grant revenue (red diamonds). The estimates confirm that districts
with greater land area per capita experienced larger permanent increases in general grant
revenue starting in 2006. These districts responded by sharply increasing expenditure in 2006.
This expenditure response grew over the next three years before partially subsiding in 2010.
The estimates for j < 2005 are close to zero and statistically insignificant, implying that the
spending gradient in exposure to the general grant reform was constant prior to the reform.
This suggests that the reform did not target districts based on preexisting fiscal trends, and
that there were no anticipatory effects.
Panel (b) plots the estimates of {γ j } separately for total expenditure (blue circles) and oil
and gas grant revenue (red diamonds). Districts with large resource endowments experienced
sharp, transitory changes in the oil and gas grant, especially over 2005–2009. The figure
suggests that expenditure responds somewhat to these shocks, though the response appears
to be less than one-for-one and is spread out over several years. Overall, expenditure in
resource-rich districts evolves more smoothly over time than the oil and gas grant.
4.4 Dynamic Expenditure Responses
Next I examine the dynamic expenditure responses to the two grants by estimating the direct
projections (Jordà, 2005)
Yd ,t+h −Yd ,t−k =β
h(Gd ,t −Gd ,t−k )+δ
h(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k )
+φh′(Xd ,t −Xd ,t−k )+λ
h
i (d),t +ε
h
d ,t , (6)
where Y is total expenditure, G is general grant revenue, and R is oil and gas grant revenue.
The model controls for covariates X described in the previous section, island-by-year effects,
and district fixed effects (via differencing). The index k ∈ {1,2} represents the duration of the
revenue shock considered, and h represents the time horizon of the expenditure response.
The horizon-specific slope coefficients βh and δh represent the per-dollar effect of a k-year
change in the general grant and the oil and gas grant, respectively, on expenditure h years
later.
Instrumental-variables (IV) estimates of the coefficients in Equation (6) are based on the
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excluded instruments Zd ,t −Zd ,t−k . In levels, the 2×1 instrument vector is
Zd ,t ≡
(
Ad ·Nd ·1(t ≥ 2006), Ed ,t · R̃(−d),t
)
,
where Ad is land area per capita in 2006, Nd is an indicator for being located in a non-
hydrocarbon-rich province, Ed ,t is district hydrocarbon endowment, and R̃(−d),t is aggregate
oil and gas grants excluding own-district grants.
Table 2 presents the first-stage results. To improve readability, land area per capita is
measured in tens of square kilometers per capita, and total oil and gas grants are measured
in 2010 IDR trillions. Panel A presents estimates based on one-year changes (k = 1). The first
instrument, Ad ·Nd ·1(t ≥ 2006), has a positive and highly significant effect on general grant
revenue per capita, with a point estimate of 0.81 and a standard error of 0.08. The magnitude
and statistical significance of this estimate are similar when the second instrument, Ed ,t ·
R̃(−d),t , is included. The second instrument has a positive and highly significant effect on oil
and gas grant revenue per capita, with a point estimate of 0.89 and a standard error of 0.09.
Similarly, this first-stage effect is insensitive to the inclusion of the first instrument. Using
two-year changes produces similar estimates (Panel B).
Table 3 reports the IV estimates of βh and δh from Equation (6) for different horizons h.24
I focus the discussion on the results for one-year changes in grants (Panel A), as the results
are qualitatively similar for two-year changes (Panel B). The point estimate of 0.71 (S.E. =
0.12) in the first row and first column indicates that an increase in the general grant by 1
rupiah per capita immediately raises total expenditure by 0.71 rupiah per capita. Columns
2–6 show that the expenditure response to the general grant steadily grows for three years,
peaking at 1.64 (S.E. = 0.26), before declining to 0.61 (S.E. = 0.17) five years after the shock.
Total expenditure is less responsive to the oil and gas grant, initially increasing by 0.21 (S.E. =
0.08) and peaking at 0.59 (S.E. = 0.16) two years later. The Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016)
F statistic, which tests for weak identification of individual coefficients on the endogenous
variables, ranges from 78 to 107 for the general grant and 106 to 157 for the oil and gas grant,
indicating that the structural parameters are strongly identified.
Each column in Table 3 reports p-values from testing two hypotheses. The first hypothesis,
H0 : βh = δh , is motivated by Proposition 3.1, which states that the spending response to a
revenue shock is increasing in the persistence of the shock (βh > δh). The second hypothesis,
H0 : βh ≤ 1, is motivated by Proposition 3.2, which states that persistent revenue shocks
will increase upfront investment in durable goods, producing a greater than one-for-one
spending response (βh > 1) if the shock is sufficiently persistent. Because h ∈ {0,1, . . . ,5},
each hypothesis is actually a family of six hypotheses. The more hypotheses one tests, the
greater the probability of rejecting at least one true null hypothesis in the family, known
24The estimates that do not control for X are similar and are reported in Appendix Table A.2. Appendix
Table A.3 reports the ordinary least squares estimates for the sake of comparison.
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as the familywise error rate (FWER). To address this concern, the table reports adjusted
p-values based on the Holm step-down method (Holm, 1979), which fixes the FWER rather
than merely fixing the significance level of each individual hypothesis test. The Holm
method is conservative and allows for arbitrary dependence between hypothesis tests.25
For comparison, the table also reports conventional (unadjusted) p-values.
There is very strong evidence against H0 : βh = δh , which is rejected at the one-percent
level for all horizons, testing methods, and shock durations. The general grant clearly induced
a larger expenditure response than the oil and gas grant. In the specification with one-year
changes in grants (Panel A), H0 : βh ≤ 1 is rejected at the five-percent level for h ∈ {2,3} using
unadjusted p-values, and is rejected for h = 3 using the Holm method (p = 0.041), providing
evidence of an overshooting expenditure response to the general grant. The evidence is
weaker in the specification with two-year changes in grants (Panel B): the hypothesis is
rejected for h = 2 using unadjusted p-values but is never rejected using Holm p-values.
Overall, the fiscal results are consistent with Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
The first row of Appendix Figure A.3 plots the expenditure responses broken down by
economic classification and ordered by the budget share: total, personnel, capital, goods
and services, and “other.”26 All types of expenditure respond more to the general grant
than to the oil and gas grant, but the difference is most pronounced for capital expenditure,
which also exhibits the largest response to the general grant in absolute terms. The next
largest difference is found in personnel spending, which could involve significant long-term
commitments due to the difficulty of firing public employees.27 Interestingly, the difference
in the responses is smallest for goods and services and “other” expenditure, which likely
contain less lumpy and more discretionary items. Together, the results suggest that lumpy
investment and committed expenditure contribute to the difference in the total expenditure
responses to the two grants.
The second row of Appendix Figure A.3 summarizes the responses for the five largest
functional categories of expenditure in order of budget share: administration, education,
infrastructure, health, and agriculture. (Note that these categories are non-exhaustive.) All
categories appear to respond more to the general grant. Infrastructure spending exhibits the
biggest difference, which again points to the importance of lumpy investment.
4.5 Threats to Validity
As already mentioned, the key identifying assumption is that the relationship between
expenditure and exposure to the grant shocks, as determined by land area per capita and
25For a family of k hypotheses with unadjusted p-values {pi }ki=1, the Holm p-values are p
H
i
= min{1,ni pi },
where ni is the number of p-values that are greater than or equal to pi .
26The “other” category includes unplanned spending, interest payments, and discretionary financial
assistance and donations (Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, and Shulze, 2013).
27In field interviews, public-sector midwives in Yogyakarta said that they could earn significantly more in the
private sector but stayed in the public sector due to job security (UNFPA Indonesia, 2014, p. 47).
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hydrocarbon endowments, would have been constant over time in the absence of shocks
to the grants. While the assumption is not testable, one implication is that districts with
varying exposure to the grant shocks would have experienced similar spending trends over
periods when no grant shocks occurred. This implication is not testable for the oil and gas
grant, which experienced shocks in every period. However, it is testable for the general
grant, which maintained a roughly time-invariant relationship with land area per capita over
2001–2005. As already discussed, the relationship between expenditure and land area per
capita was constant over time prior to 2006 (Figure 3), which is consistent with the identifying
assumption.
The identifying assumption could also be violated if other policy or economic shocks
coincided with the grant shocks and differed in their intensity according to district exposure
to the grant shocks. For example, the estimated response to the oil and gas grant would be
biased if changes in oil and gas production both correlated with changes in the grant and
influenced expenditure. However, as already discussed, this is unlikely to be an important
source of bias, as there is no clear relationship between changes in hydrocarbon production
and changes in the oil and gas grant, even allowing for lagged effects (Figure 1).
Alternatively, the estimates could be biased if grant shocks were correlated with changes
in other sources of revenue. To conserve space, Appendix Table A.4 presents estimates of
the mean responses of alternative revenue sources over horizons 0 through 5. An additional
1 rupiah per capita of general grant revenue is associated with an additional 0.07 rupiah
per capita (S.E. = 0.03) of the special grant in the specification with one-year shocks. This
effect is half as large, and statistically insignificant, in the specification with two-year shocks.
The responses of own-source revenue and shared tax revenue are small in magnitude and
statistically indistinguishable for the general grant and the oil and gas grant. Because the
special grant is an earmarked, discretionary transfer, one may be concerned that this grant
targeted districts that benefited the most from the general grant reform. Any bias due to this
grant is necessarily small, given the small magnitude of the point estimate. Nevertheless, I
re-estimate the model controlling for the special grant, noting that the endogeneity of this
grant could introduce a new source of bias. The estimates reported in Appendix Table A.5 are
slightly smaller than the baseline estimates, but the general pattern is very similar. Overall,
there is little indication that other sources of revenue cause significant bias.
Finally, the estimates could be biased if the functional form of Equation (6) is incorrect. In
particular, the assumption that spending responds symmetrically to increases and decreases
in revenue might not hold, due to downward rigidities in expenditure. Asymmetric spending
responses could lead to a mistaken conclusion that spending responds more to the general
grant, because the effect of the general grant is identified from a single increase whereas the
effect of the oil and gas grant is identified from several increases and decreases. To examine
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whether this is an important source of bias, I estimate the model
Yd ,t+h −Yd ,t−k =β
h(Gd ,t −Gd ,t−k )+δ
h+(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k )
+
+δh−(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k )
−
+φh′(Xd ,t −Xd ,t−k )+λ
h
i (d),t +ε
h
d ,t , (7)
which allows for asymmetric responses to increases and decreases in the oil and gas grant,
denoted by
(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k )
+
≡ (Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k ) ·1(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k ≥ 0)
(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k )
−
≡ (Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k ) ·1(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−k < 0).
Appendix Table A.6 presents the results. Focusing on one-year changes in grants (Panel
A), expenditure increases significantly in response to increases in the oil and gas grant, while
the response to decreases in the oil and gas grant is much weaker. The null hypothesis
of symmetry (δh+ = δh−) is rejected at the 10-percent level for h ∈ {2,3} using unadjusted
p-values, but not when using the Holm correction. This provides suggestive evidence of
asymmetric responses. However, the null hypothesis that increases in the two grants induce
the same response (βh = δh+) is decisively rejected for all time horizons and testing methods.
The baseline results therefore are not driven by asymmetric responses to the oil and gas grant.
5 Impacts on Public Service Delivery
5.1 Data
Having established that the fiscal responses to the two grants are consistent with the theory, I
next examine the impacts on public service delivery. Data on public goods and services come
from the Village Potential Statistics (Pendataan Potensi Desa, or PODES), a triennial census
that is intended to cover every village in Indonesia. Each survey is filled out by the village
head and includes information on public goods and services related to education, health,
and infrastructure. I merge villages across six survey waves from 1999 to 2014, producing a
balanced panel of around 42,000 villages located in districts in the analysis sample. I then
aggregate outcomes to the district level. (See Appendix Section A.4 for details.)
The outcome variables belong to the following categories: public schools, health facilities,
health personnel, and road quality. I focus on these outcomes due to data availability and the
fact that district governments are responsible for either provision (education and health) or
financing (local roads) of these services.28 Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics. All
28Village governments play a lead role in the upgrading and maintenance of local infrastructure, such as roads,
bridges, and piped water systems. Districts contribute to the financing of village infrastructure projects and
procure engineers, but in most cases village governments initiate and implement the projects (World Bank,
2010).
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of the measures of public service delivery involve either lumpy investment (schools, health
clinics, road quality) or committed expenditure (health personnel). The theory predicts that
the general grant will have a larger impact on these outcomes than the oil and gas grant, and
that the outcomes may not even respond to the oil and gas grant.
5.2 Identifying Assumptions
As previously discussed, the key identifying assumption is that districts with different exposure
to the grant shocks would have experienced similar trends in public service delivery in the
absence of shocks to the grants. Apart from the concerns discussed in the context of fiscal
responses, one potential problem is that less developed areas could be experiencing catch-
up growth in public services over this period. If public service delivery trends differed for
districts with different population densities for reasons other than the general grant reform,
the estimates would be biased. Catch-up growth in public services would likely produce
differential trends prior to the reform, however. I test for differential pretrends ahead.
5.3 Reduced-Form Effects
I begin by estimating the reduced-form impacts of exposure to the two grants on public
service delivery using the regression
Yd ,t =
∑
ℓ∈L
θℓAd ·Nd ·D
ℓ
t +
∑
ℓ∈L
γℓEd ·D
ℓ
t +π
′Xd ,t +αd +λi (d),t +ud ,t , (8)
where Yd ,t is a public service outcome in district d in survey year t , and D
ℓ
t is an indicator that
equals one if t = ℓ. The set L includes all available survey years except for the reference year,
2005. Thus θℓ and γℓ measure the change in the gradients of Y in exposure to the general
grant reform and exposure to the oil and gas grant, respectively, between 2005 and year ℓ.
Figure 4 displays point estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for the parameters
in Equation (8). Panel (a) plots the estimates of {θℓ}. This gradient is roughly constant
over time prior to 2006, which means that pretrends were similar for districts with different
exposure to the general grant reform.29 For almost all outcomes, the gradient increases after
2006, suggesting that the permanent increase in the general grant increased public service
delivery. The only exception is public primary schools per capita, for which the gradient
decreases after 2006. This decrease is smaller than the increase in the gradient of public
secondary schools per capita. As shown in Appendix Figure A.4, the gradient of school access,
measured as the share of villages with at least one school, did not change for public primary
schools, whereas it increased for public kindergartens and public secondary schools. This
suggests that the decrease in the gradient of public primary schools is due to a reduction
29There is a slight upward pretrend in the gradient of public secondary schools, but this pretrend is small
relative to the change in the gradient following the general grant reform.
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in schools in villages that already had multiple schools. Overall, the general grant reform
appears to have increased access to public schools.
Panel (b) of Figure 4 displays the estimates of {γℓ}. Despite the large increase in the oil
and gas grant in 2006, only the gradient of doctors per capita sharply increases from 2005
to 2008. The gradients of public secondary schools per capita and access to paved roads
steadily grow over the entire sample period, but changes in these gradients do not coincide
with the sharp changes in the oil and gas grant. The reduced-form evidence is inconsistent
with investment responding to transitory shocks to revenue.
5.4 Mean Responses of Public Service Delivery
Next I examine how public service delivery responds to the grants on a per-dollar basis.
Because outcomes are observed only every three years, I aggregate grant revenue over time
by taking three-year averages. For year t in which public service delivery is observed, let
Gd ,t denote average general grant revenue in district d across years t , t −1, and t −2, and
likewise let Rd ,t denote the three-year average of the oil and gas grant.
30 I apply the same
transformation to the instruments and estimate the direct projections
Yd ,t+h −Yd ,t−3 =β
h(Gd ,t −Gd ,t−3)+δ
h(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−3)
+φh′(Xd ,t −Xd ,t−3)+λ
h
i (d),t +ε
h
d ,t , (9)
for h ∈ {0,3,6}. Differencing removes district fixed effects, and island-by-year effects control
for arbitrary regional differences in the evolution of public services over time. Equation (9)
allows grants to have lagged effects, due to lagged expenditure responses or time to build.
Table 4 reports IV estimates of the mean responses to the two grants,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}β
h/3 and
∑
h∈{0,3,6}δ
h/3, to conserve space. (Appendix Figure A.5 plots the entire dynamic responses.)
These estimates represent the average change in public service delivery over the short and
medium term due to an increase in grant revenue by IDR 1 million (≈ USD 100) per capita.
For context, total revenue per capita averages around 2 million IDR per capita over the sample
period. Columns 1–3 report the estimates for public schools. The mean response of public
kindergartens to the general grant is 0.295 (S.E. = 0.125), which means that increasing the
general grant by IDR 1 million per capita raises the number of kindergartens per 10,000
people by almost 0.3. This is a large increase relative to the baseline mean of around 0.2.
Surprisingly, the provision of public primary schools falls in response to the general grant,
with a mean response of −0.628 (S.E. = 0.220). However, this effect is small relative to the
baseline mean of around 8. The mean response of public secondary schools is 1.046 (S.E.
0.162), which represents a near-doubling relative to the baseline mean of 1.2. Overall, the
general grant significantly increases the provision of public schools, as the increase in public
30In 2002 Gd ,t and Rd ,t are measured as two-year averages because the grants did not exist in 2000.
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kindergartens and secondary schools is over twice a large as the reduction in primary schools.
By contrast, the mean responses to the oil and gas grant are all close to zero and statistically
insignificant.31
Columns 4–6 report the estimates for health personnel and facilities. The mean response
to the general grant is 0.559 (S.E. = 0.206) for doctors, 1.339 (S.E. = 0.466) for midwives, and
0.745 (S.E. = 0.426) for health care centers. These effects are one third, one quarter, and one
quarter of the baseline means of the respective outcomes. Once again, the mean responses
to the oil and gas grant are small and statistically insignificant. The outcome in column 7
is the share of villages where the main road is paved. At baseline, the average share is 0.63.
Increasing the general grant by IDR 1 million per capita raises this share by almost 0.05. The
effect of the oil and gas grant is virtually zero.
For six out of seven outcomes considered, the general grant has a positive, statistically
significant, and economically large effect. In five of these six cases, we can statistically reject
equal responses to the two grants at the five-percent level using conventional p-values and
at the 10-percent level using p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. Thus
most public services, considered individually, respond significantly more to the general grant
than to the oil and gas grant, consistent with Proposition 3.3.
To assess overall responses of public service delivery, I construct a public services index,
defined as the average of the seven public good outcomes after standardizing each outcome
by its baseline mean and standard deviation. As shown in column 8, the mean response of
the index to the general grant is 0.522 (S.E. = 0.109), implying that public service delivery
increases by half a standard deviation. The mean response to the oil and gas grant is −0.069
(S.E. = 0.104), and the hypothesis of equal responses to the two grants is easily rejected
(p < 0.001). Again, the general grant appears to stimulate economically and statistically
significant improvements in public service delivery, while the oil and gas grant does not. In
fact, the estimates for the oil and gas grant are precise enough to rule out modest effects.
5.5 Threats to Validity
The potential sources of bias in estimating βh and δh in Equation (9) are similar to those
discussed for the fiscal responses. The fact that the gradient of public service delivery in
exposure to the general grant reform is roughly constant over time prior to 2006 suggests that
the estimated impacts of the general grant are not driven by prior trends in services (Figure 4).
The estimates are very similar when no controls are used or when special grant revenue is
added to the set of controls (Appendix Tables A.7 and A.8). When I allow for asymmetric
responses to increases and decreases in the oil and gas grant, I consistently find that public
service delivery responds more to the general grant than to increases in the oil and gas grant
(Appendix Table A.9). The OLS estimates also suggest that public service delivery responds
31The effects of the two grants on total public schools differ at the five-percent level. (Result not reported.)
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more to the general grant, but the point estimates for the general grant are considerably
smaller than the IV estimates (Appendix Table A.10). This is consistent with the general grant
endogenously increasing in response to negative shocks at the district level.
It is possible that the grants have different effects on local politics, which could impact
how revenue is translated into services. This would not necessarily induce bias in the
baseline estimates, but it would change the interpretation of those estimates. Appendix
Table A.11 reports IV estimates of the effects of the two grants on different measures of
political competition. For the first outcome (number of candidates), higher values indicate
greater competition. For the remaining outcomes (Herfindahl Index of vote shares, size of
winning coalition, reelection of incumbent, and margin of victory), higher values indicate
less competition. I estimate two versions of the model: the first assuming that grants in the
election year affect the outcomes, and the second assuming that grants in the year before
the election affect the outcomes. The reason is that the appropriate timing is unclear, as
elections happen any time from January to December and grants are disbursed in installments
throughout the year. The estimates indicate that neither grant has a strong effect on political
competition, and in nine out of 10 regressions we fail to reject the hypothesis that the grants
have equal effects.
5.6 Response to Permanent Oil and Gas Grant Revenue
The fact that the general grant stimulates greater public service delivery, while the oil and gas
grant does not, is consistent with district governments adjusting lumpy public good provision
only when there is a large change in lifetime fiscal resources. An alternative mechanism could
be that the oil and gas grant is more susceptible to waste or embezzlement by public officials.
This seems unlikely, as the grants are subject to the same rules and oversight by the central
government. Luckily, this mechanism has testable implication: a permanent increase in the
oil and gas grant should have a much smaller impact on public service delivery than the
permanent increase in the general grant.
Decentralization induced a large permanent increase in the oil and gas revenue received
by district governments. Prior to 2001, districts received virtually no revenue from local
natural resource extraction. The increase in permanent revenue induced by decentralization
therefore approximately equals the average value of the oil and gas grant from 2001 to 2014,
denoted by Rd . To examine the impact of permanent oil and gas revenue on public service
delivery, I estimate the long-difference regression
Yd ,2014 −Yd ,1999 = δRd +φ
′Xd +λi (d) +εd , (10)
where Yd ,2014 −Yd ,1999 is the change in the outcome from 1999 to 2014.
32 The model controls
32The baseline year is defined as 2002 for doctors and midwives, which are missing data in 1999.
25
for island fixed effects, λi (d), and covariate vector Xd , which contains land area per capita
multiplied by a dummy for being located in a non-hydrocarbon-rich province, as well as
separate splitting dummies for parent and child districts.
Table 5 presents the estimates of δ using hydrocarbon endowment as an instrument
for Rd . The full-sample results presented in Panel A indicate that permanent oil and gas
revenue stimulates greater provision of public kindergartens and secondary schools and
lesser provision of public primary schools. These results are qualitatively similar to the
estimates for the general grant, albeit smaller in absolute value. Permanent oil and gas
revenue has no effect on the number of doctors, and it increases the number of midwives and
health centers, though the latter effect is statistically insignificant. Compared to the general
grant, the oil and gas grant has a larger effect on midwives and a smaller effect on health care
centers, though in both cases the 95-percent confidence interval includes the point estimate
for the general grant. Interestingly, the oil and gas grant increases the prevalence of paved
roads by twice as much as the general grant, and the 95-percent confidence interval excludes
the point estimate for the general grant. The final column indicates that overall public service
delivery increases by 0.358 standard deviations (S.E. = 0.112). The corresponding estimate for
the general grant is larger at 0.522 but still falls within the 95-percent confidence interval for
the oil and gas grant.
In Panels B and C of Table 5, the sample is restricted to districts in hydrocarbon-rich
provinces and geographically similar “control” districts. The “controls” in Panel B are districts
whose centroid is within 100 km of a hydrocarbon-rich province, and the “controls” in
Panel C are districts that border a hydrocarbon-rich province. The estimates based on these
subsamples are very similar to the full-sample estimates, implying a slightly larger increase
in overall public service delivery.
Collectively, the long-difference estimates suggest that permanent increases in the two
grants stimulate public service delivery to a similar degree. Thus the baseline results for
public service delivery likely reflect the differing persistence of the two grants in the post-
decentralization period, rather than a greater propensity for the oil and gas grant to be wasted
or stolen.
6 Conclusion
Indonesian districts experienced large shocks to unconditional grants in the period following
decentralization. Districts with greater land area per capita and few natural resources saw
a larger permanent increase in the general grant starting in 2006. Districts richly endowed
with hydrocarbons experienced large swings in the oil and gas grant. Public service delivery
strongly responded to the general grant, but not to the oil and gas grant, suggesting that local
governments consider the persistence of revenue shocks when deciding how to adjust lumpy
public goods. The pattern of fiscal responses, and the responses to a permanent increase in
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oil and gas revenue, support this interpretation. Other potential mechanisms fail to explain
the results. Revenue persistence is an important, yet neglected, determinant of how public
service delivery responds to revenue shocks.
A long line of research argues that non-tax revenue hinders government performance,
but scholars have only recently started comparing policy responses to tax and non-tax
revenue. This work has done an admirable job in identifying exogenous increases in local
tax revenue using the rollout of tax-capacity investments (Gadenne, 2017) and upward
revisions to assessed property values (Martínez, 2020). Both types of interventions plausibly
induce permanent increases in tax revenue via permanently broadening the tax base. By
contrast, sources of non-tax revenue can differ markedly in their persistence. To quantify the
accountability effects of local taxation, one must first establish that tax and non-tax revenue
shocks used for identification purposes are of similar persistence.
The results are potentially relevant to how central governments use intergovernmental
grants to conduct national fiscal policy. The general grant stimulated larger and more
immediate fiscal responses than the oil and gas grant. This suggests that increasing transfers
to local governments during economic downturns could be more effective at stimulating the
economy when the increase is perceived to be permanent.
If local responses to revenue shocks depend on the shock’s impact on lifetime fiscal
resources, then both the initial size and the persistence of the shock should matter. This paper
studies a context in which revenue shocks were similar in size but differed in persistence.
An interesting question for future work is whether responses differ according to the initial
size of the shock, holding persistence fixed. Future research should also examine how local
governments respond to different types of revenue shocks in contexts with significant local
taxation, where governments have an additional margin of response—tax cuts.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: Fiscal Variables (Annual)
General Grant Revenue per Capita 1.16 0.87 0.00 7.95 4,671
Oil & Gas Grant per Capita 0.15 0.66 0.00 10.17 4,671
AreaPC06 × Non-Oil/Gas × Year ≥ 2006 0.08 0.22 0.00 2.72 4,671
Endow. per Capita × Agg. Oil & Gas Grant 0.21 0.79 0.00 10.30 4,671
Total Revenue per Capita 2.03 1.86 0.35 23.71 4,622
Special Grant Revenue per Capita 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.99 4,632
Own-Source Revenue per Capita 0.14 0.15 0.00 1.12 4,630
Shared Tax Revenue per Capita 0.14 0.17 0.00 1.18 4,480
Total Expenditure per Capita 2.00 1.83 0.28 22.52 4,618
Personnel Expenditure per Capita 0.89 0.57 0.03 6.69 4,445
Capital Expenditure per Capita 0.55 0.78 0.00 11.49 4,604
Goods & Services Expenditure per Capita 0.38 0.43 0.00 7.45 4,393
Other Expenditure per Capita 0.16 0.23 0.00 5.46 4,357
Administration Expenditure per Capita 0.59 0.70 0.01 11.18 3,692
Education Expenditure per Capita 0.52 0.32 0.00 3.10 3,693
Infrastructure Expenditure per Capita 0.33 0.57 0.00 10.76 3,689
Health Expenditure per Capita 0.16 0.14 0.00 1.80 3,693
Agriculture Expenditure per Capita 0.08 0.10 0.00 1.12 3,676
Population (Millions) 0.59 0.61 0.03 5.33 4,680
Panel B: Public Goods and Services (Triennial)
Public Kindergartens per 10,000 People 0.30 0.50 0.00 9.05 1,720
Public Primary Schools per 10,000 People 7.30 3.14 1.60 23.75 1,720
Public Secondary Schools per 10,000 People 1.57 1.17 0.00 11.06 1,720
Doctors per 10,000 People 1.93 1.50 0.00 14.50 1,715
Midwives per 10,000 People 6.03 3.48 0.61 31.60 1,715
Health Care Centers per 10,000 People 2.57 1.74 0.59 17.38 1,356
Share of Villages with Paved Road 0.72 0.25 0.00 1.00 1,695
Notes: All fiscal variables are measured in constant 2010 IDR 1 million (≈ USD 100) per capita. Data on health
care centers are unavailable in 2008.
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Table 2: First Stage Estimates
General Grant p.c. Oil & Gas Grant p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: One-Year Changes (k = 1)
AreaPC06 × Non-Oil/Gas × Year ≥ 2006 0.81∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.04)
Endow. per Capita × Agg. Oil & Gas Grant −0.01 0.89∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 4,238 4,238 4,238 4,238
District clusters 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 358 358 358 358
Panel B: Two-Year Changes (k = 2)
AreaPC06 × Non-Oil/Gas × Year ≥ 2006 0.84∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.14) (0.13) (0.02)
Endow. per Capita × Agg. Oil & Gas Grant 0.10∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 3,909 3,909 3,909 3,909
District clusters 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 332 332 332 332
Notes: Panel A presents first-stage estimates based on one-year differences of the variables, and Panel B presents
estimates based on two-year differences. Each regression controls for island-by-year effects and indicators
for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent and child districts, as well as two lags of these
indicators. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by
district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Dynamic Responses of Total Expenditure to Grants
Response of Total Expenditure per Capita after h Years
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: One-Year Changes in Grants (k = 1)
General Grant p.c. 0.71∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.17) (0.33) (0.26) (0.17) (0.17)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.21∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.00
(0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
Adjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
H0: Gen. Grant ≤ 1
Unadjusted p-value 0.993 0.289 0.050 0.007 0.953 0.990
Adjusted p-value 0.993 1.000 0.248 0.041 1.000 1.000
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 86.4 98.7 103.0 107.4 78.3 106.9
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 126.6 124.7 125.2 106.3 157.5 133.4
Observations 4,238 3,909 3,568 3,232 2,889 2,548
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 358 330 302 274 246 218
Panel B: Two-Year Changes in Grants (k = 2)
General Grant p.c. 0.79∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.14) (0.18)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.12 0.35∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.07 −0.15∗ −0.04
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Adjusted p-value 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010
H0: Gen. Grant ≤ 1
Unadjusted p-value 0.922 0.339 0.029 0.582 1.000 0.994
Adjusted p-value 1.000 1.000 0.175 1.000 1.000 1.000
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 48.4 49.7 50.6 50.2 51.4 50.3
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 427.7 440.7 418.8 432.2 444.2 476.6
Observations 3,909 3,568 3,232 2,888 2,548 2,210
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 332 304 276 248 220 192
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of βh and δh in Equation (6). Panel A presents estimates based on one-year
changes in grants, and Panel B presents estimates based on two-year changes in grants. Each regression controls
for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent and
child districts, as well as two lags of these indicators. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F -statistics
are reported for each endogeneous variable. Adjusted p-values use the Holm correction for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by
district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Mean Responses of Public Service Delivery to Grants
Public Schools per 10,000 People Health Personnel & Facilities per 10,000 People Share of Villages Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kindergarten Primary Secondary Doctors Midwives Health Centers Paved Road
General Grant p.c. 0.292∗∗ −0.632∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 1.336∗∗∗ 0.748∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.219) (0.168) (0.204) (0.465) (0.424) (0.020) (0.109)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. −0.004 −0.085 −0.106 −0.048 −0.252 0.063 −0.002 −0.070
(0.033) (0.071) (0.214) (0.127) (0.297) (0.119) (0.016) (0.104)
Baseline mean outcome 0.190 8.009 1.184 1.669 5.737 2.605 0.634 0.000
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.024 0.015 0.000 0.007 0.006 0.109 0.026 0.000
Adjusted p-value 0.073 0.059 0.000 0.036 0.034 0.109 0.052
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 104.7 104.7 104.7 104.8 104.8 102.8 104.3 104.7
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 670.7 670.7 670.7 659.1 659.1 571.7 719.4 670.7
Observations 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,372 1,372 1,017 1,356 1,376
District clusters 344 344 344 343 343 339 339 344
Prov. × year clusters 111 111 111 111 111 83 111 111
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of the mean responses of public service delivery to the general grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}β
h/3, and to the oil and gas grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}δ
h/3,
obtained by replacing the outcome in Equation (9) with
∑
h∈{0,3,6} Yd ,t+h/3−Yd ,t−3. Because the data on health care centers are missing in 2008, β
0 and δ0 are not identifiable
for this outcome, so the table reports
∑
h∈{3,6}β
h/2 and
∑
h∈{3,6}δ
h/2. Each regression controls for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split,
defined separately for parent and child districts, as well as two lags of these indicators. The baseline mean of the outcome variable is measured in 2002. Adjusted p-values
use the Holm correction for multiple hypothesis testing. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F -statistics are reported for each endogeneous variable. Standard
errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Public Service Delivery Responses to Permanent Oil and Gas Grant Revenue
Long Difference of Outcome:
Public Schools per 10,000 People Health Personnel & Facilities per 10,000 People Share of Villages Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kindergarten Primary Secondary Doctors Midwives Health Centers Paved Road
Panel A: Full Sample of Districts
Avg. Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.132∗∗ −0.321∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.001 1.561∗∗ 0.345 0.091∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.163) (0.251) (0.083) (0.607) (0.218) (0.018) (0.112)
KP first-stage F -stat. 133.3 133.3 133.3 133.2 133.2 132.7 132.7 133.3
Observations 344 344 344 343 343 339 339 344
Panel B: Control Districts within 100 km of Hydrocarbon-Rich Province
Avg. Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.140∗∗∗ −0.235 0.694∗∗∗ 0.030 1.502∗∗ 0.347 0.093∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.165) (0.252) (0.078) (0.620) (0.219) (0.018) (0.112)
KP first-stage F -stat. 126.9 126.9 126.9 126.9 126.9 126.3 126.3 126.9
Observations 258 258 258 258 258 253 253 258
Panel C: Control Districts Bordering Hydrocarbon-Rich Province
Avg. Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.144∗∗ −0.122 0.567∗∗ 0.026 1.229∗ 0.430∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.183) (0.284) (0.077) (0.691) (0.231) (0.022) (0.127)
KP first-stage F -stat. 95.2 95.2 95.2 95.2 95.2 94.0 94.0 95.2
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 104 104 107
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of δ in Equation (10). Outcomes are measured in long differences from 1999 to 2014, except for doctors and midwives, which are
measured in long differences from 2002 to 2014. Each regression controls for island fixed effects and indicators for whether the district ever split, defined separately for
parent and child districts. The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) first-stage Wald rk F -statistic is reported. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Permanent and Transitory Shocks to Grant Revenue
(a) District General Grant Revenue by Land Area per Capita
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(b) District Oil and Gas Grant Revenue and Aggregate Production
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Notes: Panel (a) plots average general grant revenue per capita for districts located in non-hydrocarbon-rich
provinces (left panel) and hydrocarbon-rich provinces (right panel) and divided according to land area per
capita in 2006. Panel (b) plots average oil and gas grant revenue for districts divided according to hydrocarbon
endowment per capita (left panel) and total oil and gas grants and production (right panel). Grants are expressed
in constant 2010 IDR 1 million. Hydrocarbon-rich provinces are Riau, Kepulauan Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Selatan,
and Kalimantan Timur. The vertical dashed line indicates the timing of the general grant reform.
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Figure 2: District Exposure to Grant Revenue Shocks
(a) Land Area per Capita
1,974 − 7,892
770 − 1,974
398 − 770
197 − 398
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1 − 11
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(b) Oil and Gas Endowment per Capita
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Notes: District borders (thin lines) and province borders (thick lines) are displayed as they existed in 2006. Oil
and gas endowment per capita is calculated according to Equation (A.2) in the Appendix. Color bins are based
on the 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles.
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Figure 3: Reduced-Form Effects of Grant Exposure on Fiscal Variables over Time
(a) Year-by-Year Gradient in AreaPC06 × NonOilGas Relative to 2005
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Notes: This figure displays point estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for parameters from Equation (5).
The blue circles are estimates of {θ j } j∈J (Panel (a)) and {γ j } j∈J (Panel (b)) when the outcome is total
expenditure per capita. The red diamonds in Panel (a) are estimates of {θ j } j∈J when the outcome is general
grant revenue per capita, and the red diamonds in Panel (b) are estimates of {γ j } j∈J when the outcome is oil
and gas grant revenue per capita.
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Figure 4: Reduced-Form Effects of Grant Exposure on Public Service Delivery over Time
(a) Year-by-Year Gradient in AreaPC06 × NonOilGas Relative to 2005
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(b) Year-by-Year Gradient in EndowPC Relative to 2005
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Notes: This figure displays point estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for {θℓ}ℓ∈L (Panel (a)) and
{γℓ}ℓ∈L (Panel (b)) in Equation (8). The (omitted) reference year is 2005.
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A Appendix (For Online Publication)
A.1 Extensions to Theoretical Model
This section briefly discusses extensions to the theoretical model.
A.1.1 Supply Bottlenecks
First, the local government could face constraints in the supply of non-traded inputs to
durables investment. The model assumes that the government can freely purchase any
quantity of the investment goods at the fixed price pt . This would be the case if the investment
goods were purchased on world markets. In reality, inputs such as building materials may be
non-traded, and their supply may be constrained by the current stock of public goods (van der
Ploeg and Venables, 2013). As a consequence, the government may face an upward-sloping
supply curve for investment goods. Suppose now that the price of investment is pt +φIt /2,
so that the marginal cost of investment is increasing and linear in the level of investment.
Then equation (1) is modified to become
(1−γ)Ct
γD t
= ιt +φ · (D t − (1−δ)D t−1)−
1−δ
1+ r
φ · (D t+1 − (1−δ)D t ), (A.1)
where ιt is the user cost of durables in the absence of supply bottlenecks. The new user cost of
durables, given by the right-hand side of (A.1), is increasing in current durables consumption
due to supply bottlenecks, and decreasing in planned future durables consumption. The
latter is due to the fact that the higher is future durables consumption, the more current
consumption lowers the future investment cost by increasing the stock carried over to the
next period.
Supply bottlenecks (i) increase the ratio of nondurables to durables consumption in every
period, (ii) increase the steady-state ratio of nondurables to durables consumption (unless
δ = 0), and (iii) smooth the adjustment of durables consumption in response to revenue
shocks. The stock of durables will not immediately jump to its new level when grant revenue
changes. As a result, the total spending response to the permanent grant shock will be less
front-loaded than in the baseline case. On the other hand, adding a fixed cost of making large
adjustments may limit the degree to which the government can smooth the adjustment of
durables.
A.1.2 Liquidity Constraints
Second, district governments may be liquidity constrained. Indeed, since decentralization
was enacted, lending to district governments has been minimal (World Bank, 2007, p. 128).
Liquidity constraints would lead to lower government spending in all periods—both when the
41
constraints bind and when they do not. This is because the prospect of liquidity constraints
binding in the future lowers current consumption (Zeldes, 1989).
In theory, liquidity constraints could also influence how governments respond to revenue
shocks. In a simple model of consumption, liquidity constraints raise the marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) and cause the MPC to be higher for small income shocks than for large
income shocks. Liquidity constraints also lead to a higher MPC for negative income shocks
than for positive income shocks (Christelis, Georgarakos, Jappelli, Pistaferri, and van Rooij,
2020). This asymmetric response implies that district governments should react more strongly
to the oil and gas grant than to the general grant, biasing the results away from the predictions
of the model with lumpy investment.
In practice, district governments accumulated substantial reserves in the years immediately
following decentralization, suggesting that liquidity constraints were not a significant issue
during most of the sample period. Reserves were especially high for the districts that benefited
the most from the general grant and the oil and gas grant, and hence were most exposed to
the grant shocks (World Bank, 2007, p. 127). Figure A.6 shows that reserves per capita were
much higher in the hydrocarbon-rich provinces of Kalimantan Timur, Riau, and Kepulauan
Riau than in other provinces. The provinces of Kalimantan Tengah and Kepulauan Bangka-
Belitung also had significant reserves, having benefited from a generous allocation of the
general grant. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that liquidity constraints were not
binding for the districts that experienced the largest shocks to the two grants.
A.1.3 Uncertainty
Third, districts may face uncertainty about future grant revenue. This would create a
demand for precautionary saving, lowering current consumption relative to expected future
consumption (Leland, 1968).33 Whether the precautionary-saving motive influences how
the government responds to a grant-revenue shock depends on how the shock affects the
overall risk faced by the government. In a model in which the government can tax private
income at any rate, Vegh and Vuletin (2015) show that the government’s spending response to
a permanent positive shock to grant revenue is larger, the weaker is the correlation between
grant revenue and private income. The reason is that the shock increases the grant share
of total income, which is assumed to be less than one half, diversifying the government’s
“portfolio.”34 The diversification effect is probably less relevant for Indonesia, where district
governments cannot set tax rates on income and property. The central government sets and
administers these taxes and rebates a portion back to the district. On average shared tax
revenue accounts for only 11 percent of the district budget, and own-source revenue from
business license fees, hotel and restaurant taxes, and utility fees accounts for nine percent of
33That is, assuming the utility function has strictly positive third derivatives.
34The authors do not consider transitory shocks, though they claim that their main results would not change
if shocks were assumed to be temporary.
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the budget. By contrast, grant revenue accounts for at least 71 percent of the district budget
on average (World Bank, 2007, p. 120). In the Indonesian context a permanent increase in
uncertain grant revenue may very well increase the total risk of public revenue, reducing the
marginal propensity to spend out of public resources.
A.2 Details on the General Grant
The formula for the general grant is
General Grant = Basic Allocation+Expenditure Needs−Fiscal Capacity.
Half of the general grant pool is devoted to the basic allocation. From 2001 to 2005, the
basic allocation consisted of a small lump-sum portion and a portion that covered most
of the civil service wage bill. Starting in 2006, the lump sum was eliminated and the basic
allocation covered the entire civil service wage bill (World Bank, 2007, p. 193), meaning that
the grant increases one-for-one with wage costs. Central regulations on recruitment and
staffing prevent exorbitant spending on public employees that would otherwise occur due to
the structure of the grant (Shah et al., 2012). The remaining half of the general grant pool is
allocated according to the fiscal gap, defined as the difference between expenditure needs
and fiscal capacity.
Since 2002, fiscal capacity has been defined as the weighted sum of imputed own-source
revenue, shared tax revenue, and shared natural resource revenue:
Fiscal Capacity = a · (Imputed Own-Source Revenue)+b · (Shared Tax Revenue)
+ c · (Shared Natural Resource Revenue).
Imputed own-source revenue is calculated as the predicted values from a regression of actual
own-source revenue on regional GDP (World Bank, 2007, p. 193). From 2002 to 2011, a has
varied between 0.5 and 1, b has varied between 0.73 and 1, and c has varied between 0.5 and
1 (Shah et al., 2012).
From 2002 to 2005 the expenditure-needs formula was
Expt · (0.4 ·PopId ,t +0.1 ·PovGapId ,t +0.1 ·AreaId ,t +0.4 ·CostId ,t ),
where Expt is average expenditure of all district governments in year t , PopId ,t is the population
index equal to the population of district d divided by average district population in year t ,
and the poverty gap, land area, and construction cost indices are defined analogously.
Starting in 2006, the expenditure-needs formula was
Expt · (0.3 ·PopId ,t +0.1 ·1/HDId ,t +0.15 ·GDPId ,t +0.15 ·AreaId ,t +0.3 ·CostId ,t ),
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where HDId ,t is the human development index and GDPId ,t is the GDP per capita index.
The expenditure-needs formula changed in three ways. First, Expt increased as a result of
the budget expansion. Second, the poverty gap index was replaced by the (inverse of) the
human development index and the GDP per capita index.35 This change had little effect on
equalization (World Bank, 2007). Third, the weights of the population, area, and cost indices
changed. In particular, greater weight was giving to less densely populated districts. Rural
districts tend to be poorer than urban districts in Indonesia. As a result, in 2006 the general
grant increased for most districts, and the increase was much larger for poor, rural districts
(World Bank, 2007). Furthermore, the policy change was persistent, as the expenditure-needs
formula changed very little from 2006 to 2011 (Shah et al., 2012).36
Holding fixed the Basic Allocation and Fiscal Capacity, the change in the per capita general
grant allocation to district d from 2005 to 2006 is given by
GenGrantd ,06
Popd ,06
−
GenGrantd ,05
Popd ,05
=
(
0.3 ·
Exp06
Pop06
−0.4 ·
Exp05
Pop05
)
+
(
0.15 ·
Exp06
Area
·
Aread
Popd ,06
−0.1 ·
Exp05
Area
·
Aread
Popd ,05
)
+
(
0.3 ·
Exp06
Popd ,06
·
Costd ,06
Cost06
−0.4 ·
Exp05
Popd ,05
·
Costd ,05
Cost05
)
+
(
0.1 ·
Exp06
Popd ,06
·
1
HDId ,06
+0.15 ·
Exp06
Popd ,06
·
GDPd ,06
GDP06
−0.1 ·
Exp05
Popd ,05
·
PovGapd ,05
PovGap05
)
.
A useful approximation to the above expression obtains under the assumption of zero district
population growth, zero change in the relative cost of construction across districts, and zero
change in the relative poverty gap across districts.37 Under these assumptions, the change
in per capita general grant allocation can be expressed in terms of the total general grant
35The latter index is district GDP per capita divided by average district GDP per capita.
36In 2010 and 2011 the weight on the area index changed to 0.1325 and 0.135, respectively, and the weights on
the inverse human development index and the GDP index increased slightly.
37District annual population growth averaged 1.3 percent over the sample period, and median annual
population growth was 1.4 percent.
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budgets in 2005 and 2006 and district characteristics measured in 2006:
GenGrantd ,06
Popd ,06
−
GenGrantd ,05
Popd ,05
≈
(0.3 ·Exp06 −0.4 ·Exp05)
Pop06
+
(0.15 ·Exp06 −0.1 ·Exp05)
Area
·
Aread
Popd ,06
+
(0.3 ·Exp06 −0.4 ·Exp05)
Popd ,06
·
Costd ,06
Cost06
+
(
0.1 ·
Exp06
Popd ,06
·
1
HDId ,06
+0.15 ·
Exp06
Popd ,06
·
GDPd ,06
GDP06
−0.1 ·
Exp05
Popd ,06
·
PovGapd ,06
PovGap06
)
.
The second term on the right-hand side accounts for a large fraction of the cross-district
variation in the general grant allocation change. The quantity (0.15·Exp06−0.1·Exp05) is large
and positive due to the overall general grant budget increase and the increase in the weight
assigned to land area. This term is scaled by relative area per capita, Aread /(Area·Popd ,06). The
change in general grant revenue received by district d from 2005 to 2006 can be approximated
as
GenGrantd ,06
Popd ,06
−
GenGrantd ,05
Popd ,05
≈ θ+π
Aread
Popd ,06
+Remainderd .
The above expression yields the approximate change in general grant revenue per capita
for districts for which the reform to the expenditure-needs formula was binding. The
formula dictated that districts rich in natural resources, which had substantial “fiscal capacity”
according to the formula, should have experienced a decline in general grant revenue over
this period. Instead, a hold-harmless provision froze the general grant amount for such
districts over this period.
A.3 Details on the Oil and Gas Grant
For the purpose of natural resource revenue sharing, district territory includes sea territory
that extends up to four nautical miles from the coastal shoreline (Law 22/1999). Government
revenue collected from oil production within a district is divided as follows: 84.5 percent
goes to the central government, 3.1 percent goes to the provincial government, 6.2 percent
goes to the producing district, and the remaining 6.2 percent is divided equally among the
non-producing districts located in the same province as the producing districts. Government
revenue collected from gas production within a district is divided as follows: 69.5 percent
goes to the central government, 6.1 percent goes to the provincial government, 12.2 percent
goes to the producing district, and the remaining 12.2 percent is divided equally among the
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non-producing districts located in the same province as the producing districts.
Formally, let RO
d ,t and R
G
d ,t denote oil and gas revenues (royalties and taxes) collected by
the central government in district d in year t , and let p(d) denote the province where district
d is located. The oil and gas grant per capita is
Rd ,t =
1
Popd ,t
(
0.062 ·ROd ,t +0.122 ·R
G
d ,t +
1
Np(d),t −1
∑
j 6=d
p( j )=p(d)
(
0.062 ·ROj ,t +0.122 ·R
G
j ,t
))
,
where Popd ,t is the population of district d in year t , and Np(d),t is the number of districts in
province p(d) in year t . Using the Rystad UCube database (Rystad Energy, 2016), I calculate
for each district the total economically recoverable oil and gas resources as of 2000 (and
known in 2000)—prior to fiscal decentralization. I then convert physical endowments into
monetary values using the average prices of oil and gas over 2001–2014, and I denote these
measures by EO
d ,t and E
G
d ,t . Each variable is measured in constant 2010 IDR (billions). The
only reason these endowment measures could vary over time is because district and province
borders sometimes change.38 Using the sharing rule, I define the variable
Ed ,t =
1
Popd ,t
(
0.062 ·EOd ,t +0.122 ·E
G
d ,t +
1
Np(d),t −1
∑
j 6=d
p( j )=p(d)
(
0.062 ·EOj ,t +0.122 ·E
G
j ,t
))
, (A.2)
which represents the oil and gas endowment per capita to which district d has a claim for
revenue-sharing purposes.
A.4 Data Appendix
Instrumental Variables
The data used for constructing the instrumental variables come from two sources. The World
Bank’s Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER) provides
district land area and population by year.39 Data on oil and gas reserves come from the
proprietary UCube database maintained by Rystad Energy (2016), an international oil and
gas consulting company.40 I define oil and gas endowments as the value of reserves that
were known to exist as of the year 2000. I assign hydrocarbon assets to districts using the
geographic coordinates of the assets in combination with a shapefile of district borders
provided by the Indonesian Statistical Bureau. For the purpose of natural resource revenue
sharing, district territory includes sea territory that extends up to four nautical miles from
the coastal shoreline (Law 22/1999). However, assigning hydrocarbon assets to districts
38Fitrani et al. (2005) find no consistent relationship between natural resources and the likelihood of a district
split from 1998–2004.
39INDO-DAPOER is hosted at ❤tt♣✿✴✴❞❛t❛❜❛♥❦✳✇♦r❧❞❜❛♥❦✳♦r❣✴❞❛t❛✴r❡♣♦rts✳❛s♣①❄s♦✉r❝❡❂✶✷✻✻.
40For details on the UCube database, see ❤tt♣s✿✴✴✇✇✇✳r②st❛❞❡♥❡r❣②✳❝♦♠✴Pr♦❞✉❝ts✴❊♥P✲❙♦❧✉t✐♦♥s✴❯❈✉❜❡.
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according to this rule leads to severe underestimation of endowments—judging from the
discrepancy between predicted and actual oil and gas grant revenue—in a few archipelagic
districts. The error is likely due to the shapefile’s omission of many small islands which extend
the claims of these districts to hydrocarbon resources. For example, Kabupaten Natuna has
272 islands, but only a few dozen are present in the shapefile. To compensate, I instead assign
offshore hydrocarbon assets to the nearest district provided that the assets are located within
50 nautical miles of the shoreline.
Revenue and Expenditure
Data on intergovernmental grants come from the Ministry of Finance (Kementerian Keuangan).41
Each year district mayors report on the district’s finances to the Ministry of Finance. Data on
other revenue sources, as well as expenditure disaggregated by economic classification and
function, come from the Ministry of Finance and INDO-DAPOER. INDO-DAPOER provides
data on revenue and expenditure broken down by economic classification up to either 2012
or 2013, depending on the variable. I add data from 2013–2014 using budget reports from the
Ministry of Finance. I also replace missing or obviously incorrect values in INDO-DAPOER
using the Ministry of Finance data. Expenditure by function is available from INDO-DAPOER
through 2012. Some data on expenditure by function in 2013 and 2014 are available from
INDO-DAPOER for a limited set of districts, however I omit these years to avoid bias due to
selective attrition.
Realized expenditure is missing in at least one year over 2002–2005 for a small number of
districts. To minimize imbalance in the panel, I replace missing realized expenditure with
budgeted expenditure for districts where budgeted and realized expenditure never differed
by more than 15 percent over the period 2001–2004.
The final fiscal dataset includes grant revenue, other sources of revenue, and expenditure
by economic classification for the years 2001–2014; and expenditure by function for the years
2001–2012. All fiscal variables are expressed in constant 2010 IDR 1 million (approximately
USD 100) per capita.
Public Goods and Services
Data on public service delivery come from the Village Potential Statistics (Pendataan Potensi
Desa, or PODES) survey waves of 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014. PODES 2000 was
enumerated in September–October of 1999, and PODES 2003 was enumerated in August of
2002. Subsequent surveys were enumerated in April or May of the year in the title. I define the
year of each observation as the enumeration year, resulting in triennial data over 1999–2014.
The surveys are intended to cover every village in Indonesia. Due to a massive tsunami
41The Ministry of Finance data are hosted at ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳❞❥♣❦✳❦❡♠❡♥❦❡✉✳❣♦✳✐❞✴.
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in 2004, PODES 2005 is missing districts on Nias Island (Nias, Nias Utara, Nias Barat, Nias
Selatan, and Gunung Sitoli).
I merge villages across the survey waves of 2003 through 2014 using village identifiers and
official crosswalks provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, or BPS).
Villages that could not be merged using identifiers are merged via exact matches of unique
village names within each district. The crosswalks appear unreliable for the waves of 2000
and earlier, so villages in 2000 are merged via exact matches of unique village names within
each district. The initial merge rate, defined as the percentage of villages in the 2014 wave
that were successfully merged across all six waves, is very high in most districts, averaging
91 percent with a median of 98 percent. Only three percent of districts in the sample have a
merge rate of less than 50 percent.
Around one quarter of villages split into multiple villages between 1999 and 2014. To
maintain a consistent unit of observation, I aggregate village outcomes up to 2000 borders. I
exclude villages that were involved in an amalgamation during the sample period (roughly
three percent of villages). I further exclude villages with data that appear miscoded or indicate
an incorrect merge. First, I drop villages with reported annual population growth of more
than 25 percent or less than −25 percent in any time period. Second, I drop villages with
reported population growth of at least 10 percent followed immediately by a population
decline of at least 10 percent, or vice versa. Finally, I drop villages with implausibly large
changes in public goods from one survey year to the next. The data cleaning procedure
reduces the sample size by 11 percent and results in a balanced panel of around 42,000
villages located in the districts included in the analysis sample (defined below).
I construct the following measures of public goods at the village level:
• Public Kindergartens: Number of public kindergartens in the village.
• Public Primary Schools: Number of public primary schools in the village.
• Public Secondary Schools: Number of public secondary schools in the village. It
aggregates junior and senior secondary schools in the village.
• Doctors: Number of doctors in the village. This variable is missing in 1999.
• Midwives: Number of midwives in the village. This variable is missing in 1999.
• Health Care Centers: Number of primary health care centers in the village. It aggregates
public health centers (puskesmas), supporting public health centers (puskesmas pembantu),
and polyclinics (poliklinik). These facilities have trained doctors and nurses that
provide basic medical care. This variable is missing in 2008.42
42Polyclinics are relatively rare compared to public health centers and supporting public health centers. The
results are very similar when polyclinics are excluded from the health care centers variable.
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• Paved Road: Indicator variable equal to one if the main village road is made of asphalt,
as opposed to gravel, dirt, or other materials.
I then aggregate these measures to the district level. Villages are assigned to districts
based on 2014 district borders, so the composition of villages within a district does not change
when a district splits into multiple districts. I express the first six measures as the number
of public goods per 10,000 people by summing across all villages in the district, dividing by
the aggregate population of these villages, and multiplying by 10,000.43 I use Paved Road to
calculate the share of villages in the district with a paved road.
Lastly, I construct an overall index of public service delivery. I standardize each outcome
variable using its mean and standard deviation in the full sample in 2002. Then I take the
average of the standardized outcome variables for each district-year observation.
District Elections
Data on the direct elections of district mayors (Pemilihan kepala daerah, or Pilkada) in years
2005–2008 were generously provided by Martínez-Bravo et al. (2017). I constructed the data
for 2010–2013 and 2015 from various sources. The General Elections Commission (Komisi
Pemilihan Umum, or KPU) shared data for 2010–2013 via email. These data were missing
information on roughly half of the elections in 2013. With the help of a research assistant,
I filled in the remaining information using Indonesian Wikipedia and local news articles. I
scraped the 2015 data from a KPU website.44 No mayoral elections were held in 2009 or 2014.
The election variables are:
• Number of Candidates: Number of candidates running in the first round of the election.
• Herfindahl Index:
∑
i s
2
i
, where si is the vote share obtained by candidate i in the first
round.
• Number of Parties in Winning Coalition: Number of parties in the coalition of the
winning candidate.
• Incumbent Reelected: Indicator variable equal to one if the incumbent won the
election. This variable is missing for elections in which the incumbent could not
run due to the term limit.
• Margin of Victory: Difference in the vote shares of the first-place and second-place
candidates in the first found, in percentage points.
43I impute 2014 village population, which is missing in the PODES, based on village population in 2011 and
an assumed annual growth rate equal to the median annual growth rate from 1999 to 2011 for villages in the
sample.
44The website is ❤tt♣✿✴✴✐♥❢♦♣✐❧❦❛❞❛✳❦♣✉✳❣♦✳✐❞✴s✐t❛♣✲✷✵✶✺✴.
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Sample Selection
To ensure that all districts in the sample operate within the same institutional environment,
I omit provinces that have a special administrative or fiscal arrangement with the central
government. These provinces are DI Yogyakarta, which has special autonomy status; DKI
Jakarta, whose districts are managed by the province; Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which has
special autonomy status and receives special autonomy funds; and Papua and Papua Barat,
which both receive special autonomy funds.
I drop the handful of districts that are missing expenditure data in 2005, as this year
is important for measuring baseline outcomes prior to the general grant reform. The five
districts on Nias Island are excluded as they are missing public good data in 2005, as already
mentioned. The final sample contains 344 districts with non-missing data on revenue,
expenditure, and public service delivery.
A.5 Magnitude of Grant Shocks
Figure A.2 displays histograms of the absolute two-year change in revenue for each of the two
grants. I use two-year changes instead of one-year changes to account for the small amount
of persistence in the oil and gas grant shocks. The general grant shock is measured over the
period 2005–2007, while the oil and gas grant shock is measured over all two-year periods,
starting with 2001–2003. Panel (a) shows the results for the entire sample of districts. Both
shocks are skewed to the right, and the skew is greater for the oil and gas grant. The mean of
the general grant shock (0.49) greatly exceeds the mean of the oil and gas grant shock (0.07),
which is unsurprising as only a small fraction of districts receive significant amounts of oil
and gas revenue.
The empirical results will, to a great degree, reflect the responses of a subsample of
districts that are highly exposed to the grant shocks. It is therefore useful to consider the
distribution of grant shocks for these districts. Panel (b) displays the general grant shock
histogram for districts exceeding the 75th percentile of land area per capita in 2006 and not
located in hydrocarbon-rich provinces, as well as the oil and gas grant shock histogram for
districts exceeding the 95th percentile in oil and gas endowment. For these two subsamples,
the mean of the general grant shock (1.11) equals the mean of the oil and gas grant shock.
(Note, however, that the rightward skew is still greater for the oil and gas revenue shock.) Thus,
the per-period value of shocks to the general grant and oil and gas revenue are reasonably
similar for districts with significant exposure to the shocks.
A.6 Time-Series Properties of the Grants
Institutional details and graphical evidence indicate that over-time variation in the general
grant is dominated by a single permanent shock, while over-time variation in the oil and
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gas grant is dominated by transitory shocks. This subsection compares the time-series
properties of the two grants in a more rigorous fashion by employing two quantitative
measures: volatility and persistence.
First, I measure the volatility of each grant using the within-district coefficient of variation,
defined as the within-district sample standard deviation divided by the overall sample
mean.45 The working hypothesis is that the oil and gas grant is more volatile than the
general grant. The within-district coefficient of variation of the oil and gas grant (1.58) is
nearly five times that of the general grant (0.32), confirming that the oil and gas grant is
significantly more volatile than the general grant.
Next, I estimate the persistence of each grant over time using autoregressions. In principle
one could apply time-series estimators to aggregate values of the two grants. However,
because the dataset contains few time periods (14 years) and many districts, a dynamic panel
model is more appropriate. I specify the model
Grantd ,t =
J∑
j=1
α j Grantd ,t− j +ηd +ψi (d),t +νd ,t (A.3)
separately for each grant variable, where ηd is a district fixed effect and ψi (d),t is an island-by-
year effect. The sum of the autoregressive coefficients,
∑J
j=1α j , captures the persistence of
the process.
Table A.1 presents estimates of the coefficients in equation (A.3) for J = 1 and J = 3. Panel
A presents the results for the general grant, and Panel B presents the results for the oil and
gas grant. For both grants we reject the presence of a unit root.46 Columns 1 and 2 report
“OLS levels” estimates that control for island-by-year effects but do not control for district
fixed effects. OLS estimates of persistence are biased upwards due to the positive correlation
between ηd and lags of Grant (Bond, 2002). Therefore, one may view the estimates as an
upper bound on the true persistence (asymptotically). The estimated persistence of the
general grant ranges from 1.00 to 1.01, while estimated persistence of the oil and gas grant
ranges from 0.88 to 0.94. The general grant therefore appears to be more persistent than the
oil and gas revenue, however these estimates are likely to be biased.
Columns 3 and 4 report the “within-groups” estimates—commonly called “fixed-effects”
estimates—which control for island-by-year effects and district fixed effects. Within-groups
estimates of persistence are biased downwards due to the negative correlation between, e.g.,
the transformed Grantd ,t−1 and the transformed νd ,t (Bond, 2002). This asymptotic bias is
45Formally, define the within-district sample variance as S̃x =
∑
d
∑
t (xd t − xd ·)
2/(N − D), where xd · =∑
t xd t /Td , Td is the number of time periods observed for district d , N =
∑
d Td is the total number of
observations, and D is the number of districts. Define the overall sample mean as x =
∑
d
∑
t xd t /N . Then the
within-district coefficient of variation is
√
S̃x /x.
46This result is based on the unit-root test by Harris and Tzavalis (1999), which assumes persistence is the
same across panels and is valid for a fixed number of time periods. We are also able to reject the presence of a
unit root in expenditure. (Results available upon request.)
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of order 1/T , where T is the number of time periods, so the bias declines as the number of
time periods grows (Nickell, 1981). Still, the bias is likely to be non-negligible with T = 14.
Furthermore, the bias is larger the more persistent is the series. Therefore, one may view the
within-groups estimates as a lower bound on the true persistence (asymptotically), where
the bound is relatively tighter for the oil and gas grant compared to the general grant. The
estimated persistence of the general grant ranges from 0.51 to 0.62, and these estimates are
quite precise. The persistence of the oil and gas grant is lower, ranging from 0.04 to 0.27, where
the former estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The general grant appears to
be much more persistent than the oil and gas grant, according to the within-groups estimates,
which are likely to be biased downwards for both grants.
Columns 5 and 6 present system GMM estimates, which do not suffer from Nickell bias
and are consistent as the number of districts grows and the number of time periods is fixed.47
According to these estimates, the persistence of the general grant ranges from 0.96 to 0.97.
The estimated persistence of the oil and gas grant ranges from 0.19 to 0.82, though these
estimates are imprecise. Overall, the three estimators point to the same conclusion: the
general grant is more persistent than the oil and gas grant.48
47System GMM was developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano
and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). I follow the recommendations of Roodman (2009) and Bazzi
and Clemens (2013) and “collapse” the instrument matrix to avoid the problem of many weak instruments.
48One may also estimate an AR(1) model, Yt =α+βYt−1 +Ut , where Yt is average revenue per capita in year t .
The difference in persistence of the two grants is large in this model as well, with or without bias corrections for
the small number of time periods. (These results are available upon request.)
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A.7 Tables
Table A.1: Persistence of Grant Revenue over Time
Panel A: General Grant p.c.
OLS Levels Within Groups System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag 1 1.00∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.48
(0.01) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.95)
Lag 2 0.14 0.03 0.56
(0.10) (0.08) (0.95)
Lag 3 −0.01 −0.03 −0.08
(0.11) (0.08) (0.15)
Persistence 1.00∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Observations 4,326 3,638 4,326 3,638 4,326 3,638
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 384 384 358 306 358 306
AR(2) test p-value 0.927 0.564
H0: unit root p-value 0.000
Within coef. of var. 0.320
Panel B: Oil & Gas Grant p.c.
OLS Levels Within Groups System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag 1 0.88∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.19 0.68
(0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.52) (1.09)
Lag 2 0.22∗∗ −0.02 0.09
(0.10) (0.13) (0.65)
Lag 3 0.16 −0.16 0.06
(0.10) (0.12) (0.93)
Persistence 0.88∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.04 0.19 0.82
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.25) (0.52) (2.56)
Observations 4,326 3,638 4,326 3,638 4,326 3,638
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 384 384 358 306 358 306
AR(2) test p-value 0.647 0.502
H0: unit root p-value 0.000
Within coef. of var. 1.579
Notes: This table shows results from regressing each grant variable on its lags. Panel A presents results for
the general grant, and Panel B presents results for oil and gas grant. Each regression includes a full set of
island-by-year dummies. Columns 1 and 2 present pooled OLS estimates which do not account for district fixed
effects. Columns 3 and 4 present “within-groups” (or “fixed-effects”) estimates which account for district fixed
effects. Columns 5 and 6 present system GMM estimates which account for district fixed effects and dynamic
panel bias. “Persistence” is defined as the sum of the lag coefficients. The AR(2) test p-value corresponds
to the null hypothesis of zero serial correlation in the error term. Each panel reports the result of the Harris
and Tzavalis (1999) unit-root test, as well as the “within” coefficient of variation, defined as the within-district
sample standard deviation divided by the sample mean. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Dynamic Responses of Total Expenditure to Grants (No Controls)
Response of Total Expenditure per Capita after h Years
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: One-Year Changes in Grants (k = 1)
General Grant p.c. 0.74∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.15) (0.32) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.21∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.01
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08)
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H0: Gen. Grant ≤ 1
Unadjusted p-value 0.993 0.186 0.028 0.001 0.893 0.989
Adjusted p-value 0.993 0.745 0.138 0.005 1.000 1.000
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 83.7 89.8 83.6 85.2 60.0 83.2
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 120.6 116.7 117.4 103.0 148.0 109.2
Observations 4,238 3,909 3,568 3,232 2,889 2,548
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 358 330 302 274 246 218
Panel B: Two-Year Changes in Grants (k = 2)
General Grant p.c. 0.86∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.12) (0.16)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.11 0.34∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.16∗∗ −0.06
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H0: Gen. Grant ≤ 1
Unadjusted p-value 0.867 0.157 0.009 0.368 0.999 0.990
Adjusted p-value 1.000 0.784 0.053 1.000 0.999 1.000
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 47.1 48.3 46.8 46.3 47.1 46.3
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 402.2 397.4 373.4 392.6 369.4 396.7
Observations 3,909 3,568 3,232 2,888 2,548 2,210
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 332 304 276 248 220 192
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of βh and δh in Equation (6). Panel A presents estimates based on one-
year changes in grants, and Panel B presents estimates based on two-year changes in grants. Each regression
controls only for island-by-year effects. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F -statistics are reported
for each endogeneous variable. Adjusted p-values use the Holm correction for multiple hypothesis testing.
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district
and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Dynamic Responses of Total Expenditure to Grants (OLS)
Response of Total Expenditure per Capita after h Years
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: One-Year Changes in Grants (k = 1)
General Grant p.c. 0.73∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.78∗∗
(0.09) (0.19) (0.25) (0.31) (0.33) (0.33)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.24∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10)
p-value: Gen. = Oil & Gas 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.065 0.121
p-value: Gen. Grant ≤ 1 0.998 0.700 0.025 0.159 0.747 0.744
Observations 4,238 3,909 3,568 3,232 2,889 2,548
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 358 330 302 274 246 218
Panel B: Two-Year Changes in Grants (k = 2)
General Grant p.c. 0.81∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.63∗∗
(0.14) (0.23) (0.24) (0.31) (0.28) (0.31)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.16 0.31∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.18 −0.03 0.11
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
p-value: Gen. = Oil & Gas 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.048 0.063 0.230
p-value: Gen. Grant ≤ 1 0.906 0.511 0.119 0.597 0.890 0.884
Observations 3,909 3,568 3,232 2,888 2,548 2,210
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 332 304 276 248 220 192
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of βh and δh in Equation (6). Panel A presents estimates based on one-
year changes in grants, and Panel B presents estimates based on two-year changes in grants. Each regression
controls for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent
and child districts, as well as two lags of these indicators. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Mean Responses of Alternative Revenue Sources to Grants
Mean Responses: 16
∑5
h=0β
h and 16
∑5
h=0δ
h
Special Grant Own-Source Shared Taxes
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: One-Year Changes in Grants (k = 1)
General Grant p.c. 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.01 0.02∗∗ −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
p-value: Gen. = Oil & Gas 0.009 0.581 0.275
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 86.8 86.4 99.6
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 126.3 126.6 113.0
Observations 4,234 4,238 4,087
District clusters 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 358 358 358
Panel B: Two-Year Changes in Grants (k = 2)
General Grant p.c. 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
p-value: Gen. = Oil & Gas 0.512 0.815 0.233
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 48.4 48.4 46.5
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 461.2 427.7 357.3
Observations 3,905 3,909 3,819
District clusters 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 332 332 332
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of the mean responses of alternative sources of revenue (per capita) to
the general grant,
∑5
h=0β
h/6, and to the oil and gas grant,
∑5
h=0δ
h/6, obtained by replacing the outcome in
Equation (6) with
∑5
h=0 Yd ,t+h/6−Yd ,t−k . Panel A presents estimates based on one-year changes in grants, and
Panel B presents estimates based on two-year changes in grants. Each regression controls for island-by-year
effects and indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent and child districts, as well
as two lags of these indicators. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F -statistics are reported for each
endogeneous variable. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Dynamic Responses of Total Expenditure to Grants (Controlling for Special Grant)
Response of Total Expenditure per Capita after h Years
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: One-Year Changes in Grants (k = 1)
General Grant p.c. 0.62∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.14) (0.19) (0.35) (0.29) (0.21) (0.22)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.19∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.08∗ −0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09)
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.009 0.043
Adjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.028 0.043
H0: Gen. Grant ≤ 1
Unadjusted p-value 0.997 0.406 0.166 0.028 0.977 0.995
Adjusted p-value 0.997 1.000 0.830 0.168 1.000 1.000
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 67.0 65.0 93.7 110.5 84.7 106.2
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 120.7 131.5 112.0 95.9 152.2 119.4
Observations 4,231 3,881 3,548 3,212 2,869 2,528
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 358 330 302 274 246 218
Panel B: Two-Year Changes in Grants (k = 2)
General Grant p.c. 0.70∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.35
(0.16) (0.27) (0.24) (0.22) (0.18) (0.25)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.09 0.33∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.107
Adjusted p-value 0.001 0.040 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.107
H0: Gen. Grant ≤ 1
Unadjusted p-value 0.971 0.466 0.086 0.777 1.000 0.996
Adjusted p-value 1.000 1.000 0.517 1.000 1.000 1.000
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 58.7 58.7 61.6 60.1 62.7 61.1
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 478.1 463.2 456.6 471.2 489.1 539.3
Observations 3,902 3,543 3,215 2,871 2,531 2,193
District clusters 344 344 344 344 344 344
Prov. × year clusters 332 304 276 248 220 192
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of βh and δh in Equation (6). Panel A presents estimates based on one-year
changes in grants, and Panel B presents estimates based on two-year changes in grants. Each regression controls
for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent and
child districts, as well as two lags of these indicators. The regressions also control for one- or two-year changes
in special grant revenue per capita. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F -statistics are reported
for each endogeneous variable. Adjusted p-values use the Holm correction for multiple hypothesis testing.
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district
and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Dynamic Responses of Total Expenditure to Grants (Allowing for Asymmetric
Responses)
Response of Total Expenditure per Capita after h Years
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: One-Year Changes in Grants (k = 1)
General Grant p.c. 0.76∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.16) (0.35) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c.+ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.37
(0.09) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.28)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c.− 0.08 0.23 0.19 −0.03 −0.57 −0.81
(0.12) (0.18) (0.31) (0.24) (0.41) (0.50)
H0: Symmetry
Unadjusted p-value 0.104 0.388 0.056 0.064 0.115 0.108
Adjusted p-value 0.416 0.388 0.334 0.318 0.229 0.325
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas+
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.006
Adjusted p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.006
H0: Gen. Grant ≤ 1
Unadjusted p-value 0.994 0.188 0.025 0.000 0.674 0.636
Adjusted p-value 0.994 0.752 0.126 0.003 1.000 1.000
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 57.0 93.7 98.5 100.1 74.8 76.2
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas+ 158.8 124.5 127.6 96.2 250.1 140.5
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas− 501.1 1534.0 1303.5 719.6 493.5 1527.7
Panel B: Two-Year Changes in Grants (k = 2)
General Grant p.c. 0.93∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.17) (0.21)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c.+ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.35 0.54
(0.10) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.30) (0.37)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c.− −0.22∗∗ −0.05 −0.29 −0.59∗ −1.01∗∗ −1.00∗
(0.11) (0.17) (0.28) (0.33) (0.43) (0.52)
H0: Symmetry
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.031 0.029 0.042 0.053 0.070
Adjusted p-value 0.003 0.125 0.143 0.127 0.105 0.070
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas+
Unadjusted p-value 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.029 0.175
Adjusted p-value 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.024 0.058 0.175
H0: Gen. Grant ≤ 1
Unadjusted p-value 0.712 0.135 0.003 0.199 0.850 0.681
Adjusted p-value 1.000 0.674 0.018 0.798 0.850 1.000
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 45.8 47.0 48.0 47.9 47.8 47.6
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas+ 108.5 115.1 143.2 120.9 198.1 93.6
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas− 960.0 539.4 728.1 445.2 278.3 200.6
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of βh , δh+, and δh− in Equation (7). Panel A presents estimates based
on one-year changes in grants, and Panel B presents estimates based on two-year changes in grants. Each
regression controls for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately
for parent and child districts, as well as two lags of these indicators. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage
F -statistics are reported for each endogeneous variable. Adjusted p-values use the Holm correction for multiple
hypothesis testing. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Mean Responses of Public Service Delivery to Grants (No Controls)
Public Schools per 10,000 People Health Personnel & Facilities per 10,000 People Share of Villages Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kindergarten Primary Secondary Doctors Midwives Health Centers Paved Road
General Grant p.c. 0.295∗∗ −0.599∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 1.361∗∗∗ 0.705 0.048∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.216) (0.148) (0.200) (0.455) (0.431) (0.020) (0.104)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.004 −0.097 −0.075 −0.037 −0.225 0.079 −0.002 −0.055
(0.033) (0.073) (0.212) (0.129) (0.299) (0.119) (0.016) (0.103)
Baseline mean outcome 0.190 8.009 1.184 1.669 5.737 2.605 0.634 0.000
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.016 0.022 0.000 0.007 0.005 0.147 0.020 0.000
Adjusted p-value 0.066 0.044 0.000 0.037 0.029 0.147 0.061
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 96.2 96.2 96.2 96.1 96.1 92.8 95.9 96.2
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 526.7 526.7 526.7 532.9 532.9 621.6 559.1 526.7
Observations 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,372 1,372 1,017 1,356 1,376
District clusters 344 344 344 343 343 339 339 344
Prov. × year clusters 111 111 111 111 111 83 111 111
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of the mean responses of public service delivery to the general grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}β
h/3, and to the oil and gas grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}δ
h/3,
obtained by replacing the outcome in Equation (9) with
∑
h∈{0,3,6} Yd ,t+h/3−Yd ,t−3. Because the data on health care centers are missing in 2008, β
0 and δ0 are not identifiable
for this outcome, so the table reports
∑
h∈{3,6}β
h/2 and
∑
h∈{3,6}δ
h/2. Each regression controls for island-by-year effects. The baseline mean of the outcome variable is
measured in 2002. Adjusted p-values use the Holm correction for multiple hypothesis testing. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F -statistics are reported for
each endogeneous variable. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Mean Responses of Public Service Delivery to Grants (Controlling for Special Grant)
Public Schools per 10,000 People Health Personnel & Facilities per 10,000 People Share of Villages Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kindergarten Primary Secondary Doctors Midwives Health Centers Paved Road
General Grant p.c. 0.275∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ 1.115∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗ 1.459∗∗∗ 0.798∗ 0.044∗ 0.532∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.224) (0.197) (0.237) (0.526) (0.469) (0.023) (0.116)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.004 −0.053 −0.144 −0.067 −0.325 0.027 −0.002 −0.079
(0.033) (0.079) (0.218) (0.126) (0.295) (0.135) (0.017) (0.105)
Baseline mean outcome 0.190 8.009 1.184 1.669 5.737 2.605 0.634 0.000
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.045 0.008 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.130 0.059 0.000
Adjusted p-value 0.136 0.039 0.000 0.057 0.033 0.130 0.119
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 74.4 74.4 74.4 74.3 74.3 55.2 73.9 74.4
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 613.5 613.5 613.5 612.2 612.2 738.8 638.2 613.5
Observations 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,325 1,325 969 1,308 1,328
District clusters 344 344 344 343 343 339 339 344
Prov. × year clusters 111 111 111 111 111 83 111 111
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of the mean responses of public service delivery to the general grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}β
h/3, and to the oil and gas grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}δ
h/3,
obtained by replacing the outcome in Equation (9) with
∑
h∈{0,3,6} Yd ,t+h/3−Yd ,t−3. Because the data on health care centers are missing in 2008, β
0 and δ0 are not identifiable
for this outcome, so the table reports
∑
h∈{3,6}β
h/2 and
∑
h∈{3,6}δ
h/2. Each regression controls for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split,
defined separately for parent and child districts, as well as two lags of these indicators. The regressions also control for special grant revenue per capita. The baseline mean
of the outcome variable is measured in 2002. Adjusted p-values use the Holm correction for multiple hypothesis testing. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage
F -statistics are reported for each endogeneous variable. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and
province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Mean Responses of Public Service Delivery to Grants (Allowing for Asymmetric Responses)
Public Schools per 10,000 People Health Personnel & Facilities per 10,000 People Share of Villages Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kindergarten Primary Secondary Doctors Midwives Health Centers Paved Road
General Grant p.c. 0.330∗∗ −0.736∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 1.665∗∗∗ 0.837∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.225) (0.190) (0.228) (0.510) (0.434) (0.025) (0.129)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c.+ 0.083 −0.330∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.060 0.518∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.180
(0.090) (0.129) (0.194) (0.143) (0.315) (0.120) (0.019) (0.114)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c.− −0.109 0.211 −0.746∗∗∗ −0.178 −1.184∗∗∗ −0.496∗∗ −0.076∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.190) (0.233) (0.263) (0.452) (0.233) (0.030) (0.085)
Baseline mean outcome 0.190 8.009 1.184 1.669 5.737 2.605 0.634 0.000
H0: Symmetry
Unadjusted p-value 0.249 0.063 0.000 0.440 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000
Adjusted p-value 0.499 0.190 0.000 0.440 0.021 0.025 0.004
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas+
Unadjusted p-value 0.081 0.036 0.000 0.011 0.017 0.124 0.569 0.003
Adjusted p-value 0.242 0.144 0.002 0.067 0.086 0.247 0.569
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 94.4 94.4 94.4 94.3 94.3 94.0 94.2 94.4
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas+ 190.5 190.5 190.5 189.8 189.8 276.9 190.6 190.5
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas− 138.8 138.8 138.8 138.6 138.6 197.4 138.3 138.8
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of the mean responses of public goods to the general grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}β
h/3, to increases in the oil and gas grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}δ
h+/3, and to
decreases in the oil and gas grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}δ
h−/3, obtained from the regressions Yd ,t+h −Yd ,t−3 =β
h(Gd ,t −Gd ,t−3)+δ
h+(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−3)
++δh−(Rd ,t −Rd ,t−3)
−+φ′(Xd ,t −
Xd ,t−3)+λi (d),t +ξd ,t . Each regression controls for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent and child districts, as
well as two lags of these indicators. The baseline mean of the outcome variable is measured in 2002. Adjusted p-values use the Holm correction for multiple hypothesis
testing. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F -statistics are reported for each endogeneous variable. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.10: Mean Responses of Public Service Delivery to Grants (OLS)
Public Schools per 10,000 People Health Personnel & Facilities per 10,000 People Share of Villages Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kindergarten Primary Secondary Doctors Midwives Health Centers Paved Road
General Grant p.c. 0.199∗ −0.257 0.368∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.232 0.422∗∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.114) (0.173) (0.121) (0.111) (0.313) (0.132) (0.012) (0.106)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c. 0.048 −0.178∗ −0.031 −0.022 −0.252 0.114 0.016 −0.017
(0.058) (0.094) (0.137) (0.094) (0.366) (0.112) (0.013) (0.110)
Baseline mean outcome 0.190 8.009 1.184 1.669 5.737 2.605 0.634 0.000
H0: Gen. = Oil & Gas
Unadjusted p-value 0.228 0.697 0.035 0.020 0.292 0.100 0.690 0.092
Adjusted p-value 0.912 0.697 0.245 0.157 0.877 0.500 1.000
Observations 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,372 1,372 1,017 1,356 1,376
District clusters 344 344 344 343 343 339 339 344
Prov. × year clusters 111 111 111 111 111 83 111 111
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the mean responses of public service delivery to the general grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}β
h/3, and to the oil and gas grant,
∑
h∈{0,3,6}δ
h/3,
obtained by replacing the outcome in Equation (9) with
∑
h∈{0,3,6} Yd ,t+h/3−Yd ,t−3. Because the data on health care centers are missing in 2008, β
0 and δ0 are not identifiable
for this outcome, so the table reports
∑
h∈{3,6}β
h/2 and
∑
h∈{3,6}δ
h/2. Each regression controls for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split,
defined separately for parent and child districts, as well as two lags of these indicators. The baseline mean of the outcome variable is measured in 2002. Adjusted p-values
use the Holm correction for multiple hypothesis testing. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and
province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Effects of Grants on Political Competition
Number of Herfindahl Number of Parties in Incumbent Margin of
Candidates Index Winning Coalition Reelected Victory
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Effects of Grants in Election Year
General Grant p.c.t −0.913 0.093 2.724∗∗ 0.036 1.247
(0.562) (0.100) (1.234) (0.219) (10.808)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c.t −0.125 −0.004 0.234 0.038 0.177
(0.123) (0.012) (0.273) (0.044) (1.699)
Dependent variable mean 4.18 0.37 3.12 0.56 18.21
p-value: Gen. = Oil & Gas 0.165 0.329 0.047 0.995 0.919
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 12.9 13.5 12.4 15.8 13.5
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 204.9 428.4 184.3 118.4 421.3
Observations 781 720 875 432 700
District clusters 306 284 349 201 276
Prov. × year clusters 197 187 212 145 178
Panel B: Effects of Grants in Year Before Election
General Grant p.c.t−1 −0.676 0.053 1.132 0.185 1.562
(0.546) (0.074) (1.466) (0.235) (8.270)
Oil & Gas Grant p.c.t−1 −0.805∗ 0.032 0.893 0.012 0.948
(0.433) (0.057) (1.247) (0.183) (6.619)
Dependent variable mean 4.18 0.37 3.12 0.56 18.21
p-value: Gen. = Oil & Gas 0.713 0.638 0.798 0.244 0.921
SW F -stat.: Gen. Grant 20.3 19.2 19.1 19.5 19.2
SW F -stat.: Oil & Gas 20.3 19.1 19.4 16.1 19.4
Observations 769 708 863 432 688
District clusters 304 282 347 201 274
Prov. × year clusters 196 186 211 145 177
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of β and δ in Yd ,t =βGd ,t−k +δRd ,t−k +φ
′Xd ,t−k +αd +λi (d),t +εd ,t for
k = 0 (Panel A) and k = 1 (Panel B). Each regression controls for district fixed effects, island-by-year effects, and
indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent and child districts, as well as two lags
of these indicators. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F -statistics are reported for each endogeneous
variable. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by
district and province-by-year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
63
A.8 Figures
Figure A.1: Classification of Hydrocarbon-Rich Provinces
(a) Map of Hydrocarbon-Rich Provinces
Hydrocarbon-rich province
Non-hydrocarbon-rich province
Excluded from sample
(b) Oil and Gas Endowment per Capita by Province
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Notes: In Panel (a), district borders (thin lines) and province borders (thick lines) are displayed as they existed in
2006. The hydrocarbon-rich provinces are Riau, Kepulauan Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Selatan, and Kalimantan
Timur. Panel (b) shows the oil and gas endowment per capita known in 2000 for each province based on
2014 population. Oil and gas endowment per capita is expressed in thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per
capita. Kalimantan Utara is combined with its parent province, Kalimantan Timur, consistent with the national
government’s revenue-sharing policy through 2014.
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Grant-Revenue Shocks
(a) All Districts
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(b) Districts with High Exposure to Grant Shocks
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Notes: Each panel displays the distribution of the absolute two-year change in the general grant over 2005–2007
(solid bars) and the distribution of absolute two-year changes in the oil and gas grant over all years (hollow
bars). Panel (a) uses the entire sample of districts, and Panel (b) uses the subsample of districts that were
highly exposed to the grant shocks. High exposure to the general grant shock is defined as exceeding the 75th
percentile in land area per capita in 2006 and not being located in a hydrocarbon-rich province. High exposure
to the oil and gas grant shocks is defined as exceeding the 95th percentile in hydrocarbon endowment. Revenue
is expressed in constant 2010 IDR per capita (millions).
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Figure A.3: Dynamic Expenditure Responses to Grants
(a) Expenditure Broken Down by Economic Classification
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(b) Expenditure Broken Down by Function
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Notes: This figure displays IV estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for βh and δh from Equation (6), using one-year changes in grants (k = 1). Values of h are on the
horizonal axis. Each regression controls for island-by-year effects and indicators for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent and child districts, as well as
two lags of these indicators.
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Figure A.4: Reduced-Form Effects of Grant Exposure on Educational Access over Time
(a) Year-by-Year Gradient in AreaPC06 × NonOilGas Relative to 2005
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(b) Year-by-Year Gradient in EndowPC Relative to 2005
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Notes: This figure displays point estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for {θℓ}ℓ∈L (Panel (a)) and
{γℓ}ℓ∈L (Panel (b)) in Equation (8). The (omitted) reference year is 2005.
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Figure A.5: Dynamic Responses of Public Service Delivery to Grants
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Notes: This figure displays IV estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for βh and δh from Equation (9).
Values of h are on the horizonal axis. The parameters cannot be identified at h = 0 for health care centers,
because this variable is missing in 2008. Each regression controls for island-by-year effects and indicators
for whether the district has split, defined separately for parent and child districts, as well as two lags of these
indicators.
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